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INTRODUCTION

After seventy years of near indifference following the landmark
regulatory takings decision ofJustice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,' the Supreme Court has spoken. The context it selected,
after declining numerous other opportunities, was the case of Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,2 in which David H. Lucas, an owner
of beachfront property in South Carolina, challenged the constitutionality of a state land use regulation that prohibited him from
building two houses on his two lots. Lucas's dilemma has become
an increasingly common one as a result of the recent enactment of
numerous federal and state statutes intended to benefit the general
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law (Camden). A.B., Rutgers University,
1966; J.D., Washington University, 1968; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania, 1971. I am
grateful for the assistance of Professor Barbara A. Ash. I wish to thank Robert A. Frankel, Rutgers Law School (Camden), class of 1993, for research assistance.
1. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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welfare through protecting and preserving important environmental
resources.
Lucas purchased two beachfront lots in 1986 with the expectation of improving them by building single-family homes suitable for
ordinary recreational enjoyment of the location. He paid $975,000
for the two lots.' At the time of his purchase, the property was
zoned single-family residential, and similarly situated lots on the
same beachfront had already been developed with homes. 4 His
plans were interrupted, however, by the passage of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act,5 which imposed a moratorium on
new beachfront development in the area that included Lucas's lots. 6
As a result of the Act, which was admittedly within the state's police
power and consistent with the public interest,7 Lucas found himself
left with property of no value.' Accordingly, he sought "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution for South Carolina's "regulatory taking" of his property. The
South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found in favor of Lucas,
awarding him $1,232,387.50 as compensation for the lost use of the
two building lots. 9 On appeal by the South Carolina Coastal Council, the agency established to implement the Beachfront Management Act, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Lucas's
intended use of his land amounted to "great public harm"-indeed,
a nuisance-and was therefore not a taking requiring compensation.' ° The United States Supreme Court, rejecting the South
Carolina Supreme Court's "great public harm" formulation, essentially decided that Lucas was entitled to constitutional "just
3. Id. at 2889.
4. Id. at 2889-90.
5. 1988 S.C. Acts 634 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to
-360 (Law. Co-op. 1991)).
6. The statute empowered the South Carolina Coastal Council to establish setback
lines. The Council drew the line behind Lucas's property, precluding him from constructing homes or other permanent structures on his lots. See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 288990.
7. Lucas conceded that South Carolina could prohibit beach construction and that
its law might well be consistent with the public interest, even "laudable." Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
See generally Dennis J. Hwang, Shoreline Setback Regulations and the Takings Analysis, 13 U.
HAW. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 36-38 (1991) (indicating the widespread occurrence of coastal erosion and identifying safety hazards incident to it).
8. Permanent, occupiable improvements were prohibited. The Act permitted a
wooden walkway no more than six feet wide and a wooden deck no larger than 144
square feet. See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889 & n.2.
9. See id. at 2890.
10. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898-900.
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compensation.""
The Lucas decision goes far beyond solving Lucas's dilemma.
In the short time since it was issued, it has become a landmark addition to land use regulatory takings jurisprudence, providing muchneeded and long-awaited guidance for land developers, regulators,
and lower courts. And the decision is, in fact, much broader, because it is not merely about property rights or about balancing
property rights with public interests; it is also about the civil rights
of individuals to use, enjoy, devise and otherwise exercise control
over their interests in property free from unlawful governmental interference. Like the right to speak or the right to travel, the right to
be secure in the use of one's own property is a constitutional right,
the breadth of which is fundamental to the existence of our constitutional democracy.
I.

THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE

Because of its multi-faceted jurisprudential impact, an analysis
of the Court's decision in Lucas must begin with consideration of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A part of the
original Bill of Rights,' 2 the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
states: ". .. nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."'" While the scope of the protected right
derives from the Supreme Court's ever-evolving interpretations of
"the three key words in the Takings Clause-'property,' 'taken,' and
'just compensation,' -1'those interpretations are made and refined
in light of the original and evolving purpose of that particular provision. Based on its specific wording, the Fifth Amendment clearly
does not prohibit the taking of property. What is prohibited is a
taking by the federal, state, or local government without just compensation.' 5 The intent of the drafters was not to prohibit the
11. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891, 2895.
12. The concept ofjust compensation for a taking of property can be traced to Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta and was an established principle of English jurisprudence at
the time of its inclusion in the Northwest Ordinance in 1787 and in the Bill of Rights.
See Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 139, 148-50 (1990) (providing a detailed history of the
right to just compensation).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).
15. The Fifth Amendment has been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)
(explaining that compensation for private property taken for public use constitutes an

essential element of due process).
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taking of property, "whether through formal condemnation proceedings, occupancy, physical invasion, or regulation,"' 6 but rather
"to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."'I7 The Supreme Court's narrow holding in Lucas
was that the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act effected a
"taking" of Lucas's property requiring that he be compensated from
public funds for the public benefit of open beach areas.' 8 The extent of Lucas's impact on land use regulatory takings jurisprudence
begins with an examination of the relevant earlier law.

II.

THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE

Although other, arguably earlier, origins for the regulatory takings doctrine can be found in legal literature,' 9 the concept was first
accepted by the Supreme Court in 1871 in the case of Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co. ,"o which involved the flooding of the plaintiff's land as
a result of a state regulation permitting the level of a lake to be
raised. In its opinion, the Court recognized that
[i]t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in
construing [the Takings Clause] . . .it shall be held that if
the government refrains from the absolute conversion of
real property to the uses of the public[,] it can destroy its
value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury
to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction
without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.2 '
This taking-by-regulation formulation laid dormant 2 at the
16. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
17. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
18. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992). The
Court's decision left open the remote possibility that, on remand, the state courts might
conclude that the proposed building of houses on Lucas's beachfront lots would constitute a prohibited use under common-law nuisance principles and that the Beachfront
Management Act therefore took no property right requiring compensation. Id. at 290102; see also infra discussion in text accompanying notes 192-195.
19. See Connors, supra note 12, at 148-53 (citing early British and American uses of
just compensation in situations involving regulatory takings).
20. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
21. Id. at 177-78.
22. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court had considered the notion that a
land use regulation could be an unlawful taking under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911) (striking
down a rule prohibiting the grazing of cattle on private land within the limits of
Yosemite National Park). The Court had also considered a number of zoning restric-
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Supreme Court level for over fifty years until the Court decided
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 2- in 1922.
A.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon

Justice Holmes, author of the majority opinion in Pennsylvania
24
Coal, is generally regarded as the source of the modem doctrine of
regulatory takings. Though not the first time the Court directly considered whether a regulation could go too far in diminishing the
value of private property, 25 Pennsylvania Coal was the first of the very
few cases 26 in which the Court invalidated a land use regulation on
tions, generally sustaining such regulation as not violative of the Due Process Clause
provided that it was not "so unreasonable that it deprive[d] the owner of the property of
its profitable use without justification." Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). It should be noted, however, that a number of state courts
did apply just compensation clauses to regulatory limitations on the use of property. See
Connors, supra note 12, at 150-52.
24. In the intervening years, the Supreme Court did uphold a number of federal and
state regulations as not violative of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment respectively. See infra text accompanying notes 112-126;
supra note 22. The standard used was that traditionally applied in substantive due process cases. Specifically, the regulation would be upheld under the police power as long
as it was "not exerted arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimination," Reinman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915), or was rationally related to the "protection of the
health, morals, and safety of the people," Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
25. Only one year before its decision in Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court held
that a rent-control regulation did not diminish the value of the property involved
enough to violate the Takings Clause. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154-56 (1921).
26. From Pennsylvania Coal through Lucas (inclusive), the Supreme Court has decided
only seven times that a regulation was an unconstitutional taking of private property. See
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding that a land use
regulation prohibiting a landowner from building on his beachfront property denied
him all economically viable use of his land, thus requiring compensation); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring compensation for the exaction
of public access as a condition to the landowner's obtaining a rebuilding permit, where
the condition was unrelated to the purposes of the permitting system); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that a statute requiring
landlords to permit a cable television company to install wires and other necessary hardware on their property effects a taking that requires compensation); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that the government's attempt to create a
public right of access to developed private property amounts to a taking requiring compensation); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding that the government must pay compensation for the value of materialmen's liens rendered
unenforceable when it seized partially completed boats upon a shipbuilder's default);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that the government's use of an
airport rendered adjacent property uninhabitable, resulting in a taking requiring compensation); Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that an act prohibiting the
mining of anthracite coal, which rendered a landowner's property virtually worthless,
effects a taking requiring compensation). Each of these cases, with the exception of
Lucas and Pennsylvania Coal, involved a taking by some form of physical invasion. See infra
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the ground that the regulation violated the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
The regulation that precipitated the revolutionary change in
this area of the law was Pennsylvania's Kohler Act 2 7 which prohibited, under certain conditions, the mining of anthracite coal within
the limits of a city in such a manner or to such an extent "as to cause
the ...subsidence of... any dwelling or other structure used as a
human habitation, or any factory, store, or other industrial or mercantile establishment in which human labor is employed." 2 The
case came to the Court as a result of the Mahons' seeking to enjoin
the mining operations of the Pennsylvania Coal Company under
their residential property, claiming that those operations were in violation of the Kohler Act. 29 Pennsylvania law recognized three estates in mining property: (1) the right to use the surface, (2) the
ownership of the underlying minerals, and (3) the right to have the
surface supported by the subjacent strata.3 0 The Mahons owned
only the surface estate because, at the time of purchase of that estate
from the coal company, the company reserved the rights to both the
mineral estate and the support estate and obtained a waiver of any
damages that might result to the surface estate from the anticipated
mining of the coal. 3 ' Accordingly, the coal company argued that, if
upheld, the Kohler Act would result in a taking of its right to use its
property interest in the coal in a commercially profitable manner;
because the only value of the mineral estate was through mining, the
regulation was the functional equivalent of a taking by eminent domain"2 and thus unconstitutional if enforced without compensation
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court invalidated the Kohler Act.3 3 Justice
Holmes expressly agreed with the coal company that
"[flor practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the
right to mine it." . . . What makes the right to mine coal
valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it
text accompanying notes 60-65, 76-85 (discussing the physical invasion and Nollan
tests).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-71 (1966) (originally enacted as Act of May 27,
1921, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198).
28. d. § 661.
29. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
30. See Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 498 (Pa.) (Kephart, J., dissenting), rev'd, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
31. See id. at 492.
32. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 401-04 (Argument for Plaintiff in Error).
33. Id. at 414.
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commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. This we think that we are warranted in assuming that the statute does.3 4
Yet Justice Holmes did more than agree with the coal company's
position; he went on to create the modern regulatory takings doctrine just recently revisited and endorsed in Lucas.
Justice Holmes acknowledged that under their police power
states may and must regulate the use of private property to protect
the rights of the public, for "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law."-3 ' But
then he clarified this expansive notion, noting that "[t]he rights of
the public ... are those that it has paid for .... The protection of
private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such
use without compensation." ' 36 In articulating the need for a case-bycase judicial balancing of the police-power qualification to the
"seemingly absolute protection" accorded by the Fifth Amendment
with the actual scope of that Amendment's protection of the rights
of individual property holders, Justice Holmes announced that
"[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking."' 37 A line was drawn. Land use regulation, at least that
free from any obligation to pay just compensation, was limited by
Pennsylvania Coal to only those instances which fall short of "going
too far."
B.

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City

Despite its eloquent coming, the regulatory takings doctrine
languished for more than half of a century. The next significant
Supreme Court analysis of whether a land use regulation effected a
taking requiring the payment of just compensation was its 1978 de38
cision in the case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.
The regulation under scrutiny was New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law. 39 The Landmarks Preservation Commission, the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 414-15 (citation omitted).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
Id.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 et seq. (1976).
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agency with primary responsibility for administering the law, designated Grand Central Terminal a historic landmark, the exterior of
which was then required by law to be kept "in good repair" at the
owner's cost and maintained without alteration except with Commission approval.4 ° The Landmarks Law was challenged when the
Commission refused to approve either of two proposed plans for
the construction of a multistory office building addition over the
Terminal, finding that such a structure would be destructive of the
Terminal's historic and aesthetic features.4" Presumably because it
expected the proposed upward expansion of the Terminal to result
in a substantial increase in the Terminal's investment value given
the high-rent, commercial nature of the surrounding neighborhood,4 2 Penn Central Transportation Company sought judicial relief. It argued that the expansion prohibition was a regulatory
taking of its property rights without just compensation, in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 43
Consistent with the tradition of the Supreme Court at that
time,4 4 the New York Court of Appeals only considered whether the
Landmarks Law was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 45 Applying the usual rational-basis substantive-due-process standard,4 6 the Court of Appeals found no denial of due process because the restrictions did not deprive Penn
Central of a "reasonable return" on its investment in the Terminal;
the restrictions still permitted continuation of the present, though
not the more profitable, use. 47 Declining the Court of Appeals' invitation to develop other bases for further judicial analysis,4" Penn
Central turned to the United States Supreme Court.
40. See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 115-16; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 2074.0 to 207-10.0.
41. Penn. Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 116-18.
42. Penn Central Transportation Company had entered into a renewable 50-year
lease with UGP Properties, Inc., and an agreement under which UGP would construct
the office building. Revenues to Penn Central under the lease totalled $1 million annually during construction and at least $3 million annually thereafter. See id. at 116.
43. Id. at 119.
44. See supra note 22; infra text accompanying notes 112-134.
45. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (N.Y.
1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The court rejected the claim that the Landmarks Law
had taken property without just compensation, indicating that such claims are "[o]f
course, . . . more accurately described as a deprivation of property without due process
of law." Id.
46. See supra notes 22, 24.
47. See Penn Cent. Transp., 366 N.E.2d at 1273-78.
48. See id. at 1279.
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The Supreme Court interrupted its pattern of indifference to
the regulatory takings doctrine created in Pennsylvania Coal by defining the issue presented on appeal as "whether the restrictions imposed by New York City's law upon appellants' exploitation of the
Terminal site effect a 'taking' of appellants' property for a public use
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."4 9 The Court then
provided some guidance "for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons."' 50 Acknowledging that no "set
formula" had been developed, the Court discussed several previously identified factors of particular significance for consideration in
similar takings cases. The three components of this quantitative approach included: "[1] [t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant .... [2] the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations .... [and 3] the

character of the governmental action."'5 Although the Court did
emphasize that a taking can more readily be found where the character of the governmental interference amounts to a physical invasion,52 it declined to suggest any relative weights for the
enumerated factors. Significantly, however, the Court's elaboration
of the Pennsylvania Coal takings standard introduced the concepts of
economically viable use 5" and "distinct, investment-backed expectations,"-54 concepts that have since been determinative in the bulk of
55
land use regulatory takings cases.
Justice Brennan began the majority's analysis of the impact of
the Landmarks Law on Penn Central by recognizing that "in a wide
variety of contexts ....

government may execute laws or programs

that adversely affect recognized economic values." 5 As apparent
background and justification incident to sustaining the Landmarks
49. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
50. Id. at 124.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 138 n.36 (noting that the city had conceded that if "the Terminal ceases
to be 'economically viable,' appellants may obtain relief").
54. Id. at 124.
55. See Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes
New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning,20 URB. LAw. 735, 758-59 (1988) ("In its recent
'takings' cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that a taking occurs if a regulation
deprives a property owner of 'economically viable use' of his land, and that a property
owner's 'reasonable, investment-backed, profit expectations,' are protected against confiscation by state and local government land-use regulations." (citations omitted)).
56. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
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Law, Justice Brennan then discussed "obvious examples" of previously upheld regulations such as taxing acts, zoning ordinances, and
laws prohibiting dangerous or harmful uses of property. 57 All of the
cases cited, however, involved the Due Process rather than the Takings Clause, and lend little support to the majority's conclusion that
the Landmarks Law, largely because it did not interfere with the
present use of the Terminal, did not go far enough to constitute an
58
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.
The period between the Penn Central decision and the much-analyzed trilogy of Supreme Court opinions delivered in 198759 involved little activity in land use regulatory takings jurisprudence.
Essentially, the few interim decisions that were issued refined the
three Penn Central factors for determining when a regulation goes
too far, thereby amounting to an unconstitutional taking under the
Pennsylvania Coal quantitative-balancing test. As expected from the
Penn Central Court's suggestion that a taking can more readily be
found when the interference amounts to a physical invasion,6' the
Supreme Court continued to regard cases of permanent physical occupation, even as minuscule as that caused by the installation of
cable television wiring, 6 as "special," 6 2 virtually always requiring
just compensation, irrespective of any economic impact. 63 In Kaiser
Aetna v. United States,6 4 the Supreme Court held that " 'the right to
exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the
property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation." 6 5
57. See id. at 124-27. For discussion of the harmful use or "nuisance doctrine" cases,
see infra text accompanying notes 112-134.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 139-146 (discussing Penn Central dissent).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 75-110.
60. See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
61. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
62. See id. at 432 ("[Plhysical invasion cases are special and have not repudiated the
rule that any permanent physical occupation is a taking."); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (requiring compensation for the physical invasion of an
easement). Earlier cases in accord include Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40
(1960), and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). Note that these physical invasion cases are four of the seven instances in which the Supreme Court held that a regulation effected a taking. See supra note 26.
63. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 ("[A] permanent physical occupation is a government
action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a
court might ordinarily examine.").
64. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
65. Id. at 179-80 (footnote omitted) (adding "even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation"). But
compare PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that shopping
center owners failed to demonstrate that the "right to exclude others" is essential to the
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In the remainder of the significant Supreme Court pre-trilogy
takings decisions, the Court attempted to refine two of the critical
economic impact factors introduced in Penn Central, but the refinements were clouded by the fact that the Court never reached the
67
66
actual takings question. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, for example,
the Court held that a property owner's challenge to a zoning ordinance restricting the number and size of buildings that could be erected on unimproved land was not yet ripe for decision because the
property owner had not yet applied for approval of a specific development plan. 68 Yet this brief opinion, holding that "the zoning ordinances on their face do not take the appellants' property without
just compensation," 6 9 implied at least a judicial concern with the
murkiness of takings jurisprudence, if not a promise of change.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell stated that a regulation "effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ...

or denies an owner economically

viable use of his land." 7 ° By stating in the disjunctive the test for a
taking requiring compensation, the Court clearly envisioned the
possibility of finding a taking for the sole reason that the regulation
failed to advance legitimate interests, as indeed it did seven years
later in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.7 1 Also clearly envisioned was the possibility that a taking might be found for the sole
reason that the regulation denied the owner economically viable
use, though not necessarily all use, of his land. By inviting the appellants in Agins to pursue their reasonable investment expectations
by submitting a development plan,7 2 the Court hinted that it would
use or economic value of their property and, therefore, denial of the right to exclude
does not amount to a "taking").
It is also unclear why the Court, in the same year it decided Kaiser Aetna, held that
the right to sell personal property-Indian artifacts containing the feathers of protected
birds-was just one strand in the bundle of property rights rather than a fundamental
property interest deserving Fifth Amendment protection and requiring compensation
when "taken." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). See also infra notes 277-278
and accompanying text.
66. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
67. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
68. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63. Agins involved the first of the many "ripeness"
requirements in land use regulatory takings cases. For a discussion of others, see Berger, supra note 55, at 786-95. See also infra note 350 (citing cases decided on ripeness
grounds).
69. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) ("Whatever may be the outer limits of 'legitimate state
interests' in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them.").
72. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
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find a taking based solely on denial of economically viable use, and
finally did so in Lucas.73 In sum, the Agins opinion can most clearly
be read as stating that in the case of the typical land use regulation
enacted in furtherance of a socially desirable goal, the takings decision will turn on whether the economic impact on the property
owner amounts to a denial of "the 'justice and fairness' guaranteed
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 7 4
C.

The 1987 Trilogy: Nollan, First English, and Keystone

In 1987, the jurisprudential flurries following the Supreme
Court's designation in Penn Central of its three significant takings factors became a dramatically well-published tempest. 75 Arguably, the
1987 trilogy was still a tempest in a teapot because of the narrow
aspects of the land use regulatory takings doctrine that the Court
directly addressed. Yet, like the Agins opinion, they foreshadowed
more.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,76 the Court found its
sixth regulatory taking. Like David Lucas, the Nollans owned a
beachfront lot and planned to build a three-bedroom house, much
like others in the vicinity, to replace their small bungalow which was
no longer fit for use. When they applied for a building permit, the
California Coastal Commission, under authority of the California
Coastal Act of 1976, 7 conditioned the issuance of the permit on an
agreement by the Nollans to grant a public easement across their
property. The purpose of this easement was to increase the public's
visual and psychological access to the public beaches located on
both sides of the Nollans' property. The Nollans viewed the accesseasement requirement as an unconstitutional taking of their property and sought judicial relief. In a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court found that the permit condition could not survive
scrutiny under Agins because it did not "substantially advance legitimate state interests." 7 8 The Court noted that "there is heightened
risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement,
rather than the stated police-power objective."-79 Focusing particularly on the lack of nexus between the permit condition and the gov73. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895, 2901 (1992).
74. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263.
75. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 55, at 735-36 ("The scope and intensity of the media
coverage of these opinions is apt and fitting testimony to their importance.").
76. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
77. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986).

78. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (reaffirming the Agins framework for takings analysis).
79. Id. at 841.
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ernmental purpose of the ban on development, the Court
characterized this type of building restriction as "not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' "80
The narrow result was not surprising. The exaction of public
access was no different from any other imposition of an easement, a
physical invasion of property that had virtually always warranted just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment."' As the Court emphasized yet again, " 'the right to exclude [others is] "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' "8..s2 More surprising was the Court's gratuitous
notation that "the right to build on one's own property," a similarly
inherent property right, "cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.'-"8
Most surprising, and indicative of the
Court's changing attitude toward land use regulation vis-a-vis individuals' rights in their property, was that the Court chose to reach
its decision by scrutinizing the application of the regulation not
under the due-process rational-relationship basis, but under the
standard of whether it would " 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved." 4 As the Court unequivocally stated, after Nollan, "there is no reason to believe . . . that so
long as the regulation of property is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical." 8'
Similarly, the narrow holding in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles 6 did not dramatically alter the existing
regulatory takings doctrine; again, however, the Court's opinion
boded change. FirstEnglish involved a temporary prohibition of any
rebuilding on property in a flood-hazard area, which included
twenty-one acres that had been used as a summer camp by the
church and had been seriously damaged by a flood.8 7 Three years
later, the regulation made the building prohibition permanent.8 8
80. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H.
1981), overruled in part by Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317 (N.H. 1988)).
81. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia repeatedly referred to the
condition as an easement. E.g., Nolan, 483 U.S. at 827, 828, 831.
82. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979))).
83. Id. at 834 n.2.
84. Id. at 834 n.3 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
85. Id. at 835 n.3.
86. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
87. See id. at 307.
88. Id. at 313 n.7.
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First English brought an inverse condemnation action, arguing that
the three-year prohibition effected a taking of its property and entitled it to just compensation. The Supreme Court held that even a
temporary taking required just compensation, 9 rejecting the California Supreme Court's rule based on its earlier Agins decision.9"
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court, after declining to consider similar claims "[flour times this decade" because of "concerns
with finality," chose to view the posture of First English as "quite
different."'" It did so by interpreting the California Court of Appeals to have held that "regardless of the correctness of the appellant's claim," no damages are recoverable for the period prior to the
92
court's declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
Under that interpretation, the constitutional question was divorced
from the merits of the takings issue and, thus, was "squarely
presented."9 "
Further evidence of the Court's renewed interest in regulatory
takings questions was Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the language and purposes of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and his reaffirmance of Pennsylvania Coal as "established doctrine." 9 4
In the third of the 1987 trilogy of regulatory takings cases, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis,95 the Supreme Court faced
a constitutional challenge reminiscent of that in Pennsylvania Coal,
this time involving Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
Land Conservation Act.9 6 Like the earlier Kohler Act, the Subsidence Act prohibited coal mining that would cause subsidence dam89. Id. at 321 ("[W]here the government's activities have already worked a taking of
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.").
90. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
91. See First English, 482 U.S. at 310-11. The four takings cases decided on finality,
rather than Fifth Amendment, grounds were MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
92. See First English, 482 U.S. at 312.
93. Id. As expected, however, on remand the California courts found that no taking
had occurred. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (answering the reserved question-whether
the specific regulation affecting First English led to an unconstitutional taking-in the
negative), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
94. See First English, 482 U.S. at 314-16.
95. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 5-23 (analyzing the Keystone opinion and finding it a "low
quality" decision).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1 to 1406.21 (1986).
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age to dwellings and other surface buildings.9 7 Pursuant to the
Subsidence Act's grant of regulatory and enforcement authority, the
state Department of Environmental Resources (DER) required that
fifty percent of the coal under protected structures be kept in place
to support the surface estate. 98 The Coal Association-whose members owned extensive coal reserves under surface property protected by the Subsidence Act and who also typically owned, as did
the coal company in Pennsylvania Coal, the support estate, including
waivers of damages caused to the surface estate by mining operations 9 9 -sought to enjoin the DER from enforcing the Subsidence
Act on the grounds that such enforcement would constitute a taking
of their coal without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.' 0 0 The Coal Association relied on Pennsylvania Coal in
apparent confidence. Despite the striking similarity between the
Kohler Act and the Subsidence Act,'
the Supreme Court agreed
with the courts below that the Subsidence Act did not effect an un0 2
constitutional taking.1
The narrow holding of Keystone was neither surprising nor significant in the stalled development of the regulatory takings doctrine. Like Agins, the Keystone controversy presented another
opportunity for the Supreme Court to decide whether a specific land
use regulation, as applied to a specific category of property owners,
denied those owners "economically viable use" of their property,
thereby amounting to a governmental taking and entitling them to
compensation. As it did in Agins, the Court treated the challenge as
a facial one, necessitating a decision in favor of the government.10 3
While land use regulators might have chosen to view the Keystone decision as judicial reluctance to expand or even reaffirm the
rule in Pennsylvania Coal, thereby somehow tipping in their favor the
balance between the right of government to regulate and the rights
of persons owning the regulated property, the opinion contained no
objective support for such an interpretation. Indeed, the better
97. Id. § 1406.4.
98. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 477 & n.7.
99. See id. at 504. See also supra text accompanying notes 30-32 (discussing the three
separate estates in mining property recognized under Pennsylvania law).
100. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478-79.
101. See id. at 506 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 479-81.
103. See id. at 493-95 ("The posture of the case is critical because we have recognized
an important distinction between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a claim that the particular impact of government action on a specific
piece of property requires the payment of just compensation.").
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view was that the Supreme Court came close to finding a regulatory
taking, reflecting an increasing concern for the rights of individuals
over their property and an indication of its readiness to broaden its
construction of the Takings Clause protections for individual owners of property.
First, the Court expressly affirmed the regulatory takings doctrine set forth in Pennsylvania Coal, as well as the Penn Central and
Agins refinements. 104 It then engaged in the two-pronged Agins
analysis, but found each component satisfied. The Keystone majority
determined that the regulation addressed a legitimate state interest,
preventing "a significant threat to the common welfare,"' 5 and that
"there is no record in this case to support a finding, similar to the
one the Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act
makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business, or that there has been undue interference with their investment-backed expectations. ' 0 Finally, while the Agins Court had
unanimously declined to consider whether a facially valid regulation
effected a taking as applied to the plaintiffs,'0 7 the Keystone majority
went on to reach this issue, even though the plaintiffs had only
mounted a facial challenge.'0 8
This 1987 trilogy of land use regulatory takings decisions completed the limited pre-Lucas development of the Supreme Court's
regulatory takings doctrine that was first articulated in Pennsylvania
Coal. Despite this limited development of the doctrine, there was
and is no question that a land use regulation will constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property entitling the affected property owner to just compensation unless it is enacted for a legitimate
public purpose, and it substantially advances that legitimate purpose, and it does not involve any physical invasion of the regulated
property. However, in addressing the question of whether a land
use regulation which meets the above three conditions but still diminishes the use or value of the land can effect an unconstitutional
taking, either on its face or as applied, there had been no precedent
and little guidance from the Supreme Court until its decision in
Lucas.
104. Id. at 484-85.
105. Id. at 485.
106. Id.
107. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).
108. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-96 (supporting the finding of no taking by noting
that "petitioners have not even pointed to a single mine that can no longer be mined for
profit").
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Even more significant to the development of the regulatory takings doctrine was that both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Keystone incorporated into their analysis the concept of a nuisance
exception to the long "established doctrine... [that] 'if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' "109 However, the
nature and scope of the exception envisioned by the two opinions
were sharply different. " 0 Relying on those confusing positions, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina found that Lucas's intended use
for his beachfront lots amounted to a nuisance and therefore held
that the government's prohibition of that use was not a taking which
required just compensation under the Fifth Amendment."' Analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas depends, accordingly,
on an examination of the long-existing nuisance doctrine that was
grafted onto the historically unrelated regulatory takings doctrine.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION

A.

Mugler v. Kansas and Its Progeny

In making its determinative nuisance exception analysis in
Lucas, the South Carolina Supreme Court relied on a short line of
cases, which it cited as authority for the view that no taking of property occurs when a regulation "exists to prevent serious public
harm."" 2 Normally viewed as the first significant opinion adopting
this qualitative approach to upholding land use regulations,' 11
Mugler v. Kansas"14 involved a brewer's challenge to state regulations that prohibited the use of his brewery for the manufacture and
sale of malt liquor. Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan found
the regulations to be a valid exercise of the police power-legitimate prohibitions "upon the use of property for purposes that are
109. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 316 (1987). See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 (approving of "[tlhe Court's hesitance to
find a taking when a state merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public
nuisances"); id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing against "allow[ing] a regulation based on essentially economic concerns to be insulated from the dictates of the
Fifth Amendment by labeling it nuisance regulation").
110. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 900-01 (S.C. 1991)
(comparing the treatment of the nuisance exception by the Keystone majority and dissent), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
111. Id. at 901.
112. Id. at 899 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 246 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
113. See Connors, supra note 12, at 158; Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory Takings:
Beyond the Balancing Test, 20 URB. LAw. 389, 390 (1988).
114. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,
or safety of the community.""'
At the time, any exercise of the police power would have withstood scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause provided it was rationally related to the "protection of the
health, morals, and safety of the people."" 6 However, Justice
Harlan further supported his position by characterizing liquor as a
common nuisance, always subject to abatement by legislatures and
courts. 117 Of note is that Justice Harlan declined to consider
whether the prohibition amounted to a taking of the brewery, dismissing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 8-the only authority for the thenunrecognized regulatory takings doctrine-as an eminent domain
case and therefore inapplicable." 19
The short line of nuisance-doctrine cases relied on by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in its Lucas opinion included two other
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court prior to its promulgation of the regulatory takings doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal. In
1915, in Reinman v. City of Little Rock 120 the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the operation of an existing livery stable, stating
that the city could, under its police power, "declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be
deemed a nuisance in fact and in law."''1 Also in 1915, in Hadacheck
v. Sebastian,'
the Court, citing its unanimous opinion in Reinman,' 23 upheld an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of bricks
near residents of Los Angeles. Again, the Court found that it was
within the city's police power to classify an existing business as a
nuisance under changed circumstances. 124
In neither of these cases did the Court consider the possibility
of a regulatory taking, but this is not surprising because that concept
had not yet been formally or clearly recognized. These were "garden variety" due-process cases, in which the regulation was subject
to no more than the "garden variety" rational-basis standard for determining constitutionality. During the Mugler era, land use regula115. Id. at 668.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 669-70.
118. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); see supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
119. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668.
120. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
121. Id. at 176.
122. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
123. Id. at 410-12.
124. See id. at 409-10 ("There must be progress, and if in its march private interests
are in the way they must yield to the good of the community.").
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tions could be challenged successfully only by proving that they did
not further a legitimate state purpose and were therefore not a
proper exercise of the police power. Because during that era, as
today, the notion of governmental power was expansive, it is not
12 5
surprising that such a successful challenge occurred only once.
There was then no need for any "exception" for regulations
1 26
promulgated to abate nuisances.
B.

The Nuisance Doctrine after Pennsylvania Coal

After the regulatory takings doctrine was introduced in Pennsylvania Coal in 1922, the Court theoretically could have treated nuisance cases as exceptions to the newly created doctrine. Yet, an
analysis of the cases cited in Lucas confirms the irrelevance of the
27
one doctrine to the other.'
In Miller v. Schoene, 128 the Supreme Court upheld Virginia's
Cedar Rust Act, which required the owner of infected cedar trees to
cut them down to save neighboring apple orchards from infection,
finding it not violative of the Due Process Clause.' 2 9 Notably, the
owner never sought relief under the just Compensation Clause for a
taking of his property. The parallel line of nuisance cases, much like
the parallel line of zoning regulation cases, 13 0 was simply not viewed
as implicating the Takings Clause.
Similarly, the last of the nuisance doctrine cases relied on by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Lucas did not consider the regulatory takings doctrine applicable. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,'
the Supreme Court, after citing Hadacheck, Reinman, and Mugler, concluded that a city ordinance prohibiting sand and gravel mining below the water table was a valid exercise of the city's police power
and therefore withstood a challenge under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court did mention that "the
fact that [the ordinance] deprives the property of its most beneficial
use does not render it unconstitutional."'132 The Court went on to
125. See Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911) (invalidating regulations prohibiting the grazing of cattle on private land within Yosemite Park).
126. Connors, supra note 12, at 148 (adding that until 1922, "all regulations which
constituted legitimate exercises of police power were upheld against takings challenges,
except regulations which physically appropriated property").
127. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
128. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
129. Id. at 280.
130. See id. at 279-80.
131. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
132. Id. at 592.
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note that "there is no evidence in the present record which even
remotely suggests that prohibition of further mining will reduce the
value of the lot in question. "133 The opinion also noted that if the
property owner met the burden of establishing the unreasonableness of the ordinance's effect on him, he would have been entitled
to just compensation under Pennsylvania Coal.' 4
The so-called "nuisance exception" line of cases consisted of
unrelated police power cases that had some limited effect on the use
of land. Factually, they fell short of "going too far" and, accordingly, were not considered an exception to the regulatory takings
doctrine until the startling merger of these parallel doctrines in
Keystone.
C.

Merger of the Nuisance Doctrine into the Regulatory Takings Doctrine

When Justice Holmes created the regulatory takings doctrine in
Pennsylvania Coal, Mugler and its progeny were well-established cases,
standing for an expansive interpretation of the police power and a
correspondingly limited construction of the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet Justice Holmes's
landmark opinion contained no mention of them, presumably because of their irrelevance to the issue of whether the Kohler Act
caused an unconstitutional taking of the coal without just compensation. Any argument that he intended any sort of nuisance exception
to his quantitative-balancing test, therefore, cannot be supported.
The opinion of Justice Brandeis, however, the sole dissenter in
Pennsylvania Coal, contains traces of a proposed nuisance exception
to the new regulatory takings doctrine. By way of introduction to
his opinion, Justice Brandeis restated the prohibitions of the Kohler
Act at issue and generalized that "[c]oal in place is land; and the
right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not so use
it as to create a public nuisance."'' 35 He further stated that the "restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use"
and that "the legislature has power to prohibit such uses without
paying compensation."'136 It is not at all clear, however, that Justice
Brandeis's dissent was based solely, if at all, on these nuisance observations. In fact, the bulk of his opinion focused on whether the
limits of the police power had been exceeded by the resulting dimi133. Id. at 594.
134. See id.
135. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
136. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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nution in value,' 3 7 an analysis consistent withJustice Holmes's doctrine and capable of leading to a conclusion that the Kohler Act, on
balance, simply did not diminish the value of the coal enough to
amount to a taking requiring just compensation.'"" Under that,
more credible, reading of the dissenting opinion, the nuisance discussion added nothing.
The actual introduction of a nuisance exception to regulatory
takings jurisprudence derives from the dissent of then-Justice Rehnquist in Penn Central. In upholding the Landmarks Law, the majority
essentially dismissed the Mugler line of cases, albeit with a footnote
reference to its role in implementing policies beneficial to the public. 3 9 Applying the Pennsylvania Coal quantitative-balancing test, the
majority concluded that the provisions of the Landmarks Law did
not interfere with all use or even the existing uses of the Terminal,
and therefore did not diminish its value enough to constitute an unlawful taking. 4 0
Justice Rehnquist, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens agreed, applied the same test but found sufficient diminution in value to effect an unconstitutional taking. His analysis began
with the literal words of the Fifth Amendment that require just compensation if "private property be taken for public use."' 14 ' Because
it was not disputed that certain valuable property rights of Penn
Central were destroyed by the Landmarks Law, 1 42 an unconstitutional taking occurred unless the government's action fell within the
"nuisance exception to the taking guarantee."' 43 Citing Mugler and
its progeny, Justice Rehnquist explained that where legislation prohibits only noxious or injurious uses of private property, it is excepted from scrutiny under the normal regulatory takings analysisthereby articulating, for the first time, a clear nuisance exception to

137. See id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 419-20 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
139. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978). In
footnote 30, the majority significantly muddied the harm-versus-benefit test. See Connors, supra note 12, at 142-43; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the
Taking Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1634-35 (1988)

("Although Justice Brennan rejects this distinction between harm and benefit in a footnote in the majority opinion in Penn Central, it refuses to die."). For an in-depth discussion of the majority opinion, see supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
140. See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 136-38; see Connors, supra note 12, at 142-43.
141. Penn Cent. Tramp., 438 U.S. at 141 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. V).

142. Id. at 142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the Pennsylvania Coal quantitative-balancing test. 14 Neither side argued that the Landmarks Law was intended to or did abate any nuisance.' 4 5 Nor was the introduction or explanation of a nuisance
exception necessary or even relevant to the analysis of either the
majority or the dissent. Indeed, the nuisance doctrine developed
independently as a factor in scrutinizing governmental regulations
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 4 ' The reason it appeared as established doctrine in the
Penn Central dissent remains a mystery, but it became an aspect of
regulatory takings jurisprudence much in need of the clarification
eventually provided by the Lucas decision.
Nine years later, in Keystone, every member of the Supreme
Court acknowledged the existence, though not the nature and
scope, of a nuisance exception to the land use regulatory takings
doctrine. The Keystone majority concluded that the Subsidence Act
was not unconstitutional, at least facially, because it met neither of
the two bases for finding a taking under the Agins test.'4 7 In considering whether the Act failed to substantially advance legitimate state
interests, the majority interjected a lengthy discussion of Mugler,
Reinman, Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt, emphasizing that these nuisance cases were not overruled by Pennsylvania Coal and suggesting,
without particularity, that nuisance-abatement regulations are less
likely than other regulations to constitute a taking.' 4 ' Given the textual location of the majority's conclusion that the Subsidence Act
was intended to prevent "a significant threat to the common welfare,"14 9 it appears that the majority believed that the Mugler line of
authority was relevant only to the first prong of the Agins test-assessment of the legitimacy of the state interests underlying the regulation. Because the determinative issue is typically whether a
regulation denies the property owner "economically viable use of

144. See id. at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent further explained that
the nuisance exception "is not coterminous with the police power itself. The question is
whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health or welfare of others." Id. at
145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., id. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Appellees are not prohibiting a

nuisance.").
146.
147.
148.
(1987).
149.

See supra text accompanying notes 112-134.
See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-93
Id. at 485.
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his land" under the second Agins prong, 5 ° the majority's slant on
the role of the nuisance exception in the development of takings
jurisprudence was not significant. The majority opinion in Keystone
rested on the coal owners' failure to establish a "diminution of value
sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in Pennsylvania Coal and our
other regulatory takings cases."''
Therefore, the South Carolina
Supreme Court's reliance on the Keystone majority for its decisionthat a governmental regulation of property use, enacted to prevent
serious public harm, cannot amount to a taking requiring just compensation-was misplaced.'

52

The Keystone dissent's position was based on the economic impact of the Subsidence Act, which effected a taking warranting just
compensation because "[s]pecifically, the Act works to extinguish
petitioners' interest in at least 27 million tons of coal."' 5 3 Of more
current importance, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, having introduced the
nuisance exception to the law of regulatory takings in his Penn Central dissent, sought to better define its proper role in the application
of the well-established Pennsylvania Coal balancing test to challenged
land use regulations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the Pennsylvania Coal
holding "today discounted by the Court has for 65 years been the
foundation of our 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence" and that "our
repeated reliance on that opinion establishes it as a cornerstone of
the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause."' 5 4 The Chief Justice clarified that the existence of a legitimate public purpose for a regulation "is merely a necessary prerequisite to the government's exercise of its taking power."' 5 5 In his
view, the nuisance exception to the ordinary quantitative-balancing
test must of necessity be extremely narrow, applied only "where the
government exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using his property to injure others."' 5 6 The nuisance exception to the Fifth Amendment compensation obligation
150. But see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (focusing on
whether the regulation in question furthered a legitimate governmental purpose related
to the regulatory scheme).
151. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493.
152. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992) ("The
South Carolina Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify [Pennsylvania Coat]'s
affirmation of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power." (citing the
Keystone dissent)).
153. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 520-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
155. Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
156. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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was available only to a nuisance statute that rested on discrete and
narrow purposes, such as those in Goldblatt, Hadacheck, and Mugler,
not to one such as the Subsidence Act that was
much more than a nuisance statute. The central purposes
of the Act, though including public safety, reflect a concern
for preservation of buildings, economic development, and
maintenance of property values to sustain the Commonwealth's tax base. We should hesitate to allow a regulation
based on essentially economic concerns to be insulated
from the dictates of 5the
Fifth Amendment by labeling it
7
nuisance regulation.'
The Chief Justice also noted that the determination of the type of
regulation that qualifies for the nuisance exception is a "question of
federal, rather than state, law, subject to independent scrutiny by
this Court."' 5 8
More significantly, the dissent argued that the nuisance exception, as every case in the Mugler line bears oUt,' 59 has never been
available "to allow the complete extinction of the value of a parcel
of property." 61 Under this view of the nuisance exception, the definition of a parcel of property-already, as in Keystone, an area without a consensus' 6 '-would become critical to takings determinations involving regulations that did not affect an owner's entire
interest in the land, such as a regulation that burdened only seventyfive percent of a lot, leaving twenty-five percent available for
16 2
development.
IV.

LUCAs

V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL

The South Carolina Supreme Court decided that Lucas's proposed construction of single-family homes similar to those of his
neighbors amounted to "great public harm"-a nuisance-and,
therefore, that the prohibition of such use by the Beachfront Management Act was not a taking requiring compensation under the
157. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
161. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992)
(acknowledging the continuing lack of a precise means of determining the property interest against which economic loss is to be measured).
162. See id. (suggesting that "[t]he answer to this difficult question may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property").
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Fifth Amendment. 6 ' The South Carolina Supreme Court considered as only one of several factors the trial court's finding that the
Act's prohibition against any building rendered the Lucas properties totally "valueless,"' ' 4 a determination that the United States
65
Supreme Court noted and accepted for purposes of its decision.'
The narrow issue addressed by the United States Supreme Court
was "whether the Act's dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas's lots accomplished a taking of private property under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments requiring the payment of 'just compensation.' ,,166 As suggested by the analysis of the Court's development of its land use regulatory takings jurisprudence, and
particularly by the substance of the 1987 trilogy, the Court both decided the narrow issue in favor of Lucas and delivered a landmark
addition to the regulatory takings doctrine. Given the broad potential impact of this decision on the doctrine-and on the viability of a
nuisance exception to the doctrine, the scope of the Takings Clause,
and the sanctity of individual rights under the United States Constitution-a thorough examination of each of the five opinions is essential to an analysis of Lucas's effect on the regulatory takings
doctrine.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor and Thomas,
began in accordance with the Court's post-Pennsylvania Coal pattern, 167 by addressing the issue of ripeness. 68 In conformance with
the First English opinion and the four-justice dissent in Keystone, the
majority chose to forego an obvious opportunity to avoid deciding
the merits, a route that would have been available by a holding that
Lucas had failed to exhaust his remedies or achieve a final decision
because of the 1990 Amendment to the Act 16 9 permitting the Coun-

163. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898-99 (S.C. 1991)
("Finding that the regulation under attack prevented a use seriously harming the public,
we have concluded that no regulatory taking has occurred."), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992). It is noteworthy that the two dissenting justices of the South Carolina Supreme
Court, while acknowledging that the Mugler line of cases allowed governmental prohibition of "noxious" uses of property, did not characterize the Act's "primary purpose [as]
the prevention of a nuisance." Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 906 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
164. See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900 (claiming that "economically viable use" test "is not
the dispositive test in all cases").
165. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
166. Id. at 2889.
167. See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text.
168. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
169. Id. at 2890-92; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991).

1993]

REGULATORY TAKINGS AFrER LucAs

1 70
cil to grant special permits for certain construction.
The majority's opinion on the merits of the takings question is
largely the application, with clarification, of the ChiefJustice's analysis in his Keystone dissent to the Lucas factual context. The Court
once again expressly reaffirmed the well-established regulatory takings doctrine, first articulated in Pennsylvania Coal, by quoting emphatically the maxim that " 'while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.' "171 The Court further reaffirmed that doctrine by actually
finding for the first time since Pennsylvania Coal that a regulation not
involving any physical invasion amounted to an unconstitutional
taking of private property requiring compensation.1 7 ' The majority
acknowledged that past decisions had "offered little insight into
when, and under what circumstances, a given regulation would be
seen as going 'too far' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment"1 7 3 and
then proceeded to clarify the factors relevant to the inquiry and
their proper application under the Pennsylvania Coal balancing
74
test.'
While the majority reaffirmed its "70-odd years" of preference
"for determining how far is too far" by engaging in "essentially 1 ad
75
hoc, factual inquiries" rather than by applying any "set formula,"
it emphatically pointed out that the Court has long recognized two
categories of land use regulatory action that generally require
awarding just compensation "without case-specific inquiry into the
public interest advanced in support of the restraint." 76 The first
category consisted of regulations that involve some physical invasion of the property.' 77 As discussed earlier, the Court's decisions
had for some time left no doubt that such invasive regulations virtually always constitute an unconstitutional taking warranting compensation.1 7 8 The second category of regulations whose burden
was almost automatically compensable-regardless of the validity of
the state interest-were those situations "where regulation denies

170. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 289'.
171. Id. at 2893 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
172. See supra note 26 (listing cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down land
use regulations).
173. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
174. See id. at 2893-95.
175. Id. at 2893 (quoting Penn Central).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. ("[N]o matter how minute the intrusion ....

tion."). See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.

we have required compensa-
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all economically beneficial or productive use of land." 1' 79 Again, as
evidenced by the applicable language ofAgins, 18 0 Keystone, 18 ' and the
other cited authorities, 8 2 the majority apparently created no new
scheme or rule.' 8 3 Rather, Justice Scalia confirmed and-given the
confusion resulting from the contrary implications of the Court's facial decisions in Agins and Keystone-also provided useful clarification
of the rule clearly stated in Agins that the Fifth Amendment is violated when land use regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.'1

8 4

In clarification of the rule that deprivation of all beneficial use
of land generally constitutes a taking requiring just compensation,
irrespective of the legitimacy of the state's interests in effecting that
deprivation, the majority explained simply that, from the landowner's point of view, total deprivation is the equivalent of physical
appropriation. s8 In addition, the majority expressed its belief that
the reaffirmed rule reduced the risk of the state pressing private
property into public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm. 186 As has been often judicially recognized, the issue
involved in takings controversies is not whether property may be
taken for public use, but rather whether the cost, as a matter of
"fairness and justice," should be borne by the individual property
owners or by the benefiting taxpayers.1' 7 Justice Scalia concluded
that the "sacrifice [of] all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good" is for good reason generally an unconstitutional
taking. ' 8 8
179. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
180. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating that a taking has
occurred if a zoning regulation "denies an owner economically viable use of his land").
181. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)
(quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
182. See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2893 (citing, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)).
183. But see id. at 2909-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had in
fact created a new "takings" scheme with its decision).
184. Id. at 2894 (quoting, with emphasis, Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
185. See id. at 2894.
186. Id. at 2894-95.
187. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
188. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2895. Subsidiary but related questions involve the determination of when an owner has been deprived of all use and value and the appropriate
property interest to be used to measure the loss in value. On the first issue, the South
Carolina trial court found a complete deprivation of all use and value-a determination
that the United States Supreme Court accepted-even though the statute permitted the
construction of certain nonhabitable improvements, such as a wooden walkway or deck.
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The majority also addressed the South Carolina Supreme
Court's conclusion that a regulation whose purpose is to prevent
"great public harm" does not require compensation to be paid
under the "harmful or noxious uses" principle in the MugLer line of
cases. Justice Scalia explained at some length that while certain of
the Court's earlier opinions suggested that "harmful or noxious
uses" of property could be proscribed without the requirement of
compensation, such a purpose in itself could not be conclusive.' 8 9
The conclusion that such a purpose in itself could be determinative
was based on an incomplete understanding of the history 9 ° and
narrow applicability of the noxious-use principle to land use regulatory takings cases.' 9 '
The noxious-use principle developed in the Mugler line of authority was in fact "merely [the Court's] early formulation of the
police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value"' 9 2 and was neither intended nor allowed by the Court to except from payment of just
compensation the regulatory deprivation of all beneficial use of the
land.' 93 Interpreting the language of the Fifth Amendment, the majority explained that complete deprivation is possible without compensation only where there is no actual taking of property because
"the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with."' 94 In other words, because the common-law "bundle of
rights" in land has never included the right to use the land in a noxious manner, a regulation that does nothing more than prevent or
abate such a noxious use takes nothing and warrants no compensation. Accordingly, the majority acknowledged that in the extremely
Id. at 2889-90 & n.2. In their dissents, Justices Blackmun and Stevens argued that the
trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
2925 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court skirted the second issue because
Lucas's asserted interest was a full fee-simple title. The Court recognized that the determination of deprivation of all economically feasible use must take into account the property interest against which the loss in value is to be measured, but acknowledged that
uncertainty exists as to the method by which this should be determined. See id. at 2894
n.7.
189. See id. at 2897-99 (" 'Harmful or noxious use' analysis was... simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements that 'land-use regulation does not effect a
taking if it substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.' " (citations and internal
quotations omitted)).
190. See id. at 2897; supra text accompanying notes 112-134.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 153-162 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion in Keystone).
192. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898-99.
193. Id. at 2899.
194. Id.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 52:162

unlikely event that the building of homes on Lucas's beachfront lots
could be found to constitute a common-law nuisance under established South Carolina principles of nuisance and property law, Lucas could be denied just compensation.' 9 5
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that the Lucas matter was ripe for decision and that in general
an owner of land that is rendered valueless by a state regulation is
entitled to just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 196 Justice Kennedy also agreed that the constitutional
right to compensation, even for deprivation of all use of land, is subject to some limitation. Like the majority, he would allow states to
prevent or abate uses that constitute common-law nuisances without
paying compensation to affected landowners. However, Justice
Kennedy would also deny compensation to landowners whose property was rendered valueless by land use regulations that are within
the reasonable expectations of those landowners. 9 7 He argued that
"[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society."' 9 8 Justice Kennedy's somewhat broader limitation on the
payment of compensation would permit more governmental flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun is a scathing criticism of virtually every aspect of the majority opinion, which in his
view "launches a missile to kill a mouse."' 9 9 Justice Blackmun began by arguing that because Lucas's claim was neither ripe nor justiciable, it should not have been reviewed.2 0 0 He then asserted that
the Court's decision to hear the case based on the record below was
inappropriate because "the trial court's finding that the property
had lost all economic value . . . is almost certainly erroneous. "201
Justice Blackmun characterized as "a new scheme" the majority's assertion that application of the long-recognized two-pronged Agins
takings test dictates that "where regulation denies all economically
195. Id. at 2901-02. The Court warned, however, that common-law principles "rarely
support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land." Id. at 2901 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
196. See id. at 2902-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[C]ourts must consider all reasonable
expectations whatever their source.").
198. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 2906-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that courts "have recognized that
land has economic value where the only residual economic uses are recreation or
camping").
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beneficial or productive use of land," compensation is generally required without inquiry into the underlying legitimate state interest. 20 2 The remainder of Justice Blackmun's dissent was directed to
pointing out certain shortcomings of the majority's categorical rule
over a less certain, but more flexible, ad hoc approach, and to highlighting inconsistencies between the majority's perspective on the
role of the Mugler line of cases and the actual language of those
cases, which suggests that a state may constitutionally prohibit even
all use of property to prevent public harm.20 3
As precise and persuasive as Justice Blackmun's dissent appears, its logic is not convincing. The Mugler line of authority developed in the context of defining the scope of police power under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 0 4
Furthermore, it was inappropriately grafted onto the unrelated reg-5
20
ulatory takings doctrine with which it has never been consistent.
Justice Blackmun suggested no alternative approach to alleviate the
long-existing confusion in the law of regulatory takings, although he
implied that a balancing of the sufficiency of the public interest with
the significance of the private cost would be involved. 20 6 Justice
Blackmun did not, however, actually take a position on whether the
Act effected a taking as to Lucas under the Fifth Amendment.
Although Justice Stevens did conclude that "the Act did not effect a taking of petitioner's property,120 7 his dissent was otherwise
much in accord with that of Justice Blackmun. Arguing that Lucas
had not yet suffered a permanent taking and had not demonstrated
any injury-in-fact to justify a temporary takings claim, Justice Stevens would also have declined review. 20 Like Justice Blackmun, he
asserted that the Court had adopted a new categorical rule rather
than affirmed an existing rule. In Justice Stevens's judgment, the
Court's new rule was "an unsound and unwise addition to the law"
and the Court's formulation of the exception to the rule was "too
rigid and too narrow. ' 20 9 After arguing that the majority's arbitrary

202. Id. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further suggested that
the majority rule shifts "the burden of showing the regulation is not a taking" to the
legislature itself. Id.
203. See, id. at 2910-12 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 112-134.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 135-162.
206. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2912 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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approach will prove unworkable, 1 0 Justice Stevens suggested that
his approach would be to consider "the risk[s] inherent in investments of the sort made by petitioner, the generality of the Act, and
the compelling purpose motivating the South Carolina Legislature." 21 ' Based on such considerations, even "assuming that [Lucas's] property was rendered valueless" by the Act, Justice Stevens
was not persuaded that a taking of Lucas's land had been
effected. 1 2
In the last of the five individual opinions, Justice Souter stated
merely that he would vote to dismiss the writ of certiorari because in
his view it was improvidently granted, given the questionable determination of the trial court that Lucas was actually deprived of the
entire economic interest in his land.2 13 Because the procedural posture of the case did not allow the Court to review that determination
or attempt to clarify the concept of a "total" taking, Justice Souter
argued that the indirect approach to the issue taken by the majority
would merely engender more confusion in an already-confused area
of takings jurisprudence.2 1 a
V.

THE NUISANCE EXCEFTION AFTER

Lucis

The nuisance exception to the regulatory takings doctrine was
the result of a grafting in Keystone of the parallel, but older and unrelated, nuisance doctrine onto the evolving land use regulatory takings doctrine first articulated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal
in 1922.215 The merger of these inherently incompatible doctrines
was particularly startling because just three months after deciding
Keystone, the Court in Nollan stated unequivocally that where the regulation of property is involved, the standards applicable to takings
challenges are not identical to those sufficient to sustain a due-pro2 16
cess challenge.
Although the majority's treatment of the so-called nuisance exception in Lucas involved only the category of takings cases where
the economic impact is a total deprivation of use, the articulated
basis for its severe limitation of the "noxious use" principle is appli210. See id. at 2918-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that the holding "effectively
freezes the State's common law" and "arrest[s] the development of the common law,"
preventing legislatures from implementing "new learning").
211. Id. at 2925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 2925-26 (Statement of Souter, J.).
214. Id.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 135-162.
216. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987).
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cable to all land use regulatory takings cases. The majority began in
the manner of Chief Justice Rehnquist's Penn Central dissent2" 7 by
focusing on two of the key words in the Takings Clause, "property"
and "taken." It reasoned that under common-law nuisance principles no owner of land had any right to use his land in a manner
harmful to others. Accordingly, a regulation that had the effect of
preventing or abating such an unlawful use took nothing at all.21
In other words, the Court corrected its inadvertent and irrational
creation of a nuisance exception in Keystone by excising the exception qua exception from the well-established, and once again reaffirmed, regulatory takings doctrine. This excision of traditional
nuisance abatement regulations from compensable takings does not
lessen, however, the importance of the governmental purposes in
support of a regulation challenged by an affected property owner,
except where the regulation falls into one of the two categoriesphysical invasion or deprivation of all use-that virtually always in21 9
volve a compensable taking.
Then-Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Penn Central attempted to carve nuisance control out of the general exercise of the
police power by arguing that "[t]he nuisance exception to the taking
guarantee is not coterminous with the police power itself."2' 2 Fairly
read, Justice Rehnquist seemed to be saying that not all police
power enactments can automatically be read as nuisance-preventing. 22 Rehnquist's Penn Central opinion would narrow the exception to only those uses of land that are dangerous to others' health,
safety, and welfare.22
The majority opinion in Keystone also pointed out that nuisance
prevention does not take anything from the property owner because
no individual has a right to use his property in a manner that harms
217. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
219. See id. at 2893.
220. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 10812 (1985); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1603 (1988).
221. There is some disagreement over the correct interpretation of the quoted sentence. See Connors, supra note 12, at 145; Epstein, supra note 95, at 20-2 1; Kmiec, supra
note 139, at 1634 n.27 (noting the different readings of the quoted language by Justices
Rehnquist and Stevens).
222. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (discussing the narrowing principles applied to the nuisance exception); Kmiec,
supra note 139, at 1634 (discussing the treatment in those two cases of the nuisance
principle).
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others.2 23 However, the Keystone opinion went to great lengths to
establish that the mine owners were not deprived of all use of their
property, and that the coal required to remain in place was only a
small part of all of the coal left to be mined. 2 24 Thus, it is unnecessary to find an inherent conflict between Keystone and Agins. Because
the Keystone majority found that the mine owners had not been deprived of all use of their property, the Agins holding remains good
law when all use or value has been lost. This seems clear from a
close reading of Keystone. Citing Mugler and the subsequent "nuisance" cases, the Keystone Court held that a " 'prohibition simply
upon the use of propertyfor purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking .. ' "225 The
emphasized language can fairly be read to indicate that harm-producing uses may be prohibited as long as other uses are allowed. 2
The Lucas decision remedies the vague manner in which the
Keystone majority applied the nuisance test. In assessing the "character of the governmental action," the Court in Keystone found that the
state sought to stop "a significant threat to the common welfare,"
which implicated "important public interests. 2 2' 7 The Court referred to the object of the regulation as being "akin to a public nuisance, ' ' 2s "tantamount to public nuisances, '2 2' and "similar to
public nuisances. ' 2 0 However, the line between nuisance and
abuse of the police power becomes increasingly hard to draw; soon,

223. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20.
224. See id. at 493-99. In Lucas, the South Carolina Supreme Court attempted to
demonstrate that the Keystone deprivation analysis was not dispositive but was used only
to show that the plaintiff had failed to meet that test as well. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901 n.4 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). In
his Keystone dissent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist emphasized that the Court had never held,
even in the so-called nuisance cases, that a regulation can completely extinguish all use
or value without compensation. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Contrary to the assertion of the South Carolina Lucas opinion, Keystone did follow
the two-prong test recognized in Penn Central and Agins, and explicitly applied both tests.
See id. at 485 ("The two factors.., have become integral parts of our takings analysis.").
225. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 489 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887))
(emphasis added).
226. Cf Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (discussing the
limits on police power which require just compensation for diminution of the value of
property).
227. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
228. Id. at 488.
229. Id. at 491.
230. Id. at 492; see generally Michelman, supra note 220, at 1602 (recognizing the traditional notion that "regulations of uses classed as socially harmful or nuisance-like ordinarily cannot be considered takings").
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it is feared, every exercise of police power controlling a "nuisancelike" use would be exempt from Takings Clause scrutiny. Broadening the application of Mugler in this manner would eviscerate the
Takings Clause."23 Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Keystone
equated nuisance prevention with broad regulation in the public interest, greatly expanding the scope of the exception."' 2
It is curious that the Keystone majority concluded that subsidence mining was analogous to nuisance avoidance. 3 3 Clearly the
regulation was substantially related to a valid public purpose,
whether or not the coal company's activity constituted a nuisance.
After finding the first prong of the Agins test satisfied, the opinion
went on to find that the coal companies could still make economically viable use of their property, 3 4 that the coal required to remain
in place did not constitute a separate property interest,2 3 5 and that
the loss of the support estate did not constitute a total deprivation
of an interest in property.2 3 6 Because both prongs of the Agins test
had been met, the majority could have rejected the challenge to the
2
Subsidence Act without the nuisance analogy.

37

Analyzing precedent in light of the categorical rule presented in
Lucas, the Court made it clear that consideration of the noxiousness
of the proposed use is relevant to assessing the state's legitimate
interest in regulating that use, that is, to the first prong of the Agins

231. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 905 (S.C. 1991)
(Harwell, J., dissenting), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). Justice Harwell warned that Keystone "does not hold that every exercise of police power can escape the Constitution by
calling that which it seeks to prevent a nuisance" because this would "become an exception which would swallow the rule." Id.
232. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488, 492. The most important court to accept Justice
Stevens's invitation to broaden the scope of the nuisance exception was, of course, the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Lucas, which deprived Lucas of compensation because
of the nuisance exception, without regard to destruction of his property values. The
South Carolina Supreme Court appears to have read even more into Justice Stevens's
invitation than he intended. See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 901 n.4; see also supra notes 109-111,
223 and accompanying text (discussing the nuisance exception as applied in Keystone).
233. See supra notes 148-152, 155-157 and accompanying text.
234. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-97.
235. Id. at 498-99.
236. Id. at 500-02.
237. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (finding a valid exercise of
police power to prevent a public harm, without making extensive nuisance findings); see
also Connors, supra note 12, at 144-46 (noting that "the actual holding is unrelated to
the nuisance exception" and adding that "the very fact that the majority had to fall back
on the quantitative test as its holding suggests reluctance on the part of some members
of the majority to accept the exception as applied by Justice Stevens"); Michelman, supra
note 220, at 1603.
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test. 23 8 The second prong of the Agins test, whether all use or value
of the property has been denied, is part of the new categorical test
decreed in the Lucas opinion. 2 3' At the same time that the Court
created this categorical test, it recognized a "nuisance exception" to
the test, distinct and separate from the examination of the use under
the first Agins prong. However, the Court greatly narrowed the
scope of the nuisance exception, finding that compensation can be
denied only when the use would constitute a nuisance under "background principles of the state's law of property and nuisance already
place[d] upon land ownership. '24 0 Because the Supreme Court
drew the exception so narrowly, compensation will be denied only
when background principles of nuisance and real property law dictate, and not when the state legislature declares that the particular
241
use is contrary to the public interest.
By limiting the extent of the discretion and authority of the
state legislature to regulate without paying compensation, the
Supreme Court rejected the holding of the South Carolina Supreme
Court that a legislative declaration of serious public harm was sufficient to deny a property owner compensation. 4 2 The Supreme
Court recognized that if the legislature has the power to declare
which regulations entitle an owner to compensation and which do
not, the protection intended by the Fifth Amendment would be
lost.24 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the language in Pennsylvania Coal that warned of "the natural tendency of
human nature.., to extend the qualification more and more until at
last private property disappears. ' 1244 The Lucas Court recognized
that a contrary holding would result in all governmental policepower regulations being self-justifying because a legislature could
always clothe its enactments in the appropriate supportive

238. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992).
239. Id. at 2893-94.
240. Id. at 2900; see Connors, supra note 12, at 179-80; Lawrence, supra note 113, at
414 n.158 (stating that "where a traditional harm preventative function seemed unequivocally paramount, even Chief Justice Rehnquist proved willing to imagine an uncompensated denial of all use" (citing First English)).
241. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898-99, 2901-02.
242. See id. at 2890.
243. Id. at 2899.

244. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), quoted in Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. at 2893. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes warned of the "danger of forgetting
that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change." 260 U.S. at 416.
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245

wording.
Of necessity, there must be a distinction for purposes of the
Takings Clause between the exercise of the police power generally
and its exercise to abate a nuisance. If every regulation designed to
avoid a public harm were to be characterized as nuisance prevention, then under the majority opinion in Keystone, compensation
would never be due and Fifth Amendment protection would be a
nullity. 24 6 But the Fifth Amendment was intended to be a limitation
on governmental authority. 2 47 To allow a governmental entity to
define the uses for which it is not obligated to compensate, that is,
to set the parameters of its own liability, would deprive the Takings
Clause of its protective purpose. To the extent that courts balance
private rights against the public interest, a broad view of nuisance
prevention based on legislative findings would destroy the position
of private property interests in the balancing process. The Lucas
ecoCourt very clearly refused to allow regulations that destroy all
2 48
nomically beneficial use to be "newly legislated or decreed.1
There is obvious danger in equating a legislative declaration of
public purpose with "nuisance prevention." Most statutes contain
broad public policy statements in sections dealing with legislative
intent, findings, or purpose. 24 9 If the courts fail to look beyond
these statements, it would be all too easy for skillful drafting to ob245. See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2898 n.12, 2899 (quipping that this would "amount[ ] to a
test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff"). Nor should courts label a proposed
use a nuisance and deny just compensation solely because the legislature chose to regulate the use. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 168 (1990)
("[T]he assertion that a proposed activity would be a nuisance merely because Congress
chose to restrict, regulate, or prohibit it for the public benefit indicates circular reasoning that would yield the destruction of the fifth amendment."); Kmiec, supra note 139, at
1632 (citing both the majority and dissenting opinions in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)).
246. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not co-

terminous with the police power itself."); see also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist,
CJ., dissenting).
247. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987).
248. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
249. The South Carolina Beachfront Management Act itself contains a long list of the
reasons for prohibiting construction in the beach and dune area, including: protecting
life and property by serving as a storm barrier; promoting tourism; preserving plant and
animal habitat; maintaining a natural healthy environment for recreation and the overall
well-being of South Carolina citizens; preserving unique vegetation; avoiding the danger
from bulkheads and other man-made beach erosion protection devices; halting the interference of uncontrolled development with the natural erosion process; and increasing
public access-to the beach. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896
n.10.
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literate constitutional protection. For example, although all the
objectives of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act were
important and substantially served valid public purposes, none, with
the possible exception of the protection of life and property by
maintaining the beach dune storm barrier, could be considered prevention of a traditionally recognized nuisance.2 50 Lucas, of course,
conceded that the regulation was necessary to prevent great public
harm, 2 5 ' but he never conceded that it was necessary to prevent a
public nuisance.
Under a broad interpretation of the nuisance exception, any
legislative declaration of great public harm could constitute nuisance prevention and allow the government to prevent all use of
property. A combination of the nuisance exception, broadly read as
in Keystone and the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas, and the application of the Mug/er rule, would allow regulation to
render a person's property valueless without the right to compensation. The nuisance exception would soon swallow the just compensation rule. 25 2 The Lucas majority rightly chose to follow the very
narrow construction given the nuisance exception in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Keystone dissent, 25 3 finding it applicable only when a
regulation prevents a landowner from inflicting a traditional public
2 54
nuisance on his neighbors.
The broad view of the nuisance exception has also been re2 55
jected in several recent decisions of the Federal Court of Claims.
250. The dissent in the South Carolina Supreme Court Lucas opinion concluded that
none of the activities prohibited by the Act constitute "noxious uses." Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 906 (S.C. 1991) (Harwell, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
251. Id. at 898. See also id. at 906 (Harwell, J., dissenting) ("Lucas has conceded the
'laudable' goals of the Act and does not challenge the legitimacy of its public purpose.").
252. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512-13 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct.
161, 168 (1990) (arguing that it would be circular logic to find that a proposed activity is
a nuisance simply because Congress regulates it); EPSTEIN, supra note 220, at 109, 11423; Connors, supra note 12, at 143, 145, 183-84 (using an "anti-harm" definition would
embrace almost all valid exercises of the police power); Lawrence, supra note 113, at
395. Professor Michelman pointed out that all of the justices in Keystone agreed that the
nuisance exception should not be read so broadly as to nullify the constitutional provision. Michelman, supra note 220, at 1603.
253. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
254. Connors, supra note 12, at 184 (commenting that to do otherwise would "lead to
inconsistent results, dependent on the personal traits of the judge making the takings
decision, [and] would also politicize the takings decision").
255. See FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 167 (holding that the nuisance exception was clearly
inappropriate); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990) (indicating that the proposed use of the property did not bring the case within the nuisance
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Although these cases involved wetlands regulation-thus encompassing a highly esteemed public goal-and implicated serious public policy concerns, 5 6 the Court of Claims held that owners of
property rendered useless by federal wetlands regulation were entitled to compensation. 5 7 Rejecting claims by the Army Corps of Engineers that the landowners were not entitled to compensation
because they were engaging in nuisance-like activities,2 58 the Court
of Claims restricted the doctrine to only those uses constituting
common-law nuisances. 5 9 If the Court of Claims had instead applied the majority opinion in Keystone, it probably would have been
compelled to find that dredging or filling a wetland was a "nuisancelike" activity, which therefore, could be prohibited without producing a regulatory taking.
The Lucas Court concluded that it could not base the distinction
between when and when not to compensate on a prevention-ofharmful-use motive or on a distinction between statutes that prevent
harm and statutes that confer benefits, and then sought a new test to
resolve the question. 26 ° Apparently seeking a bright-line standard,
the Court attempted to fashion a clear test: A use can be prohibited
without the requirement to pay compensation--even if it is the only
use to which the property can be put-if that use constitutes a traditional nuisance under state law. 2 6 ' Viewed in this context, it is evident that the Takings Clause was not intended to apply to longstanding common-law nuisances.262 Traditionally, courts could not
exception); Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 556-57 (1989) (concluding that
"the nuisance exception cannot be viewed in isolation"); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v.
United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1176 (Fed. Cir.) (criticizing efforts to apply the nuisance
exception in the case as "twice-flawed"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
256. See generally Hwang, supra note 7, at 2-3, 36-38.
257. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 167; Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 161. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the rightful denial of a dredge or fill permit can lead to a
takings claim if it leaves the owner no economically viable use of property. United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) ("Only when a permit is
denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 'economically viable' use of the land in
question can it be said that a taking has occurred.").
258. See FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 166; Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl.
Ct. 381, 395 (1988).
259. Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 167 (holding that rock mining was not a public nuisance); Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 396 (ruling that filling in wetlands was not a public
nuisance); see also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
260. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-2900 (1992).
261. Id. at 2900.
262. See Kmiec, supra note 139, at 1639-40 ("[A] nuisance-based definition of private
property is in harmony with a constitutional structure designed to counteract the
majoritarian tendency to isolate individual citizens for disproportionate burdens.").
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fashion a remedy more broadly than was necessary to cure the nuisance; therefore, nuisance prevention was a limited exception with a
limited remedy.2 6 3
This test was chosen because it embodied a self-evident proposition. If the regulated use could be enjoined in a public or private
action, then the property owner would have no property interest in
his ability to continue that use. When the challenged regulation deprived him of that already-actionable use, the property owner was
entitled to no compensation because he had no redressable prop2
erty right in the first place. 6

The critical question raised by the nuisance exception is
whether compensation is due for a regulation that prohibits a traditional nuisance, yet deprives the owner of all use of his property. If
an absolute nuisance exception exists, the answer should be that
compensation is not available to the property owner, as the Lucas
Court concluded. 265 This answer is a strong argument for a very
narrow interpretation of the nuisance exception. The exception
should apply only in exigent circumstances involving severe and immediate threats to public health or safety where the regulation is
designed specifically to control the danger. Only with a narrow interpretation could Fifth Amendment compensatory rights be protected. The opposite conclusion, that compensation is necessary
despite the regulation's focus on preventing a traditional nuisance,
would require a per se rule of compensation for any regulation that
renders property entirely unusable. This answer is too expansive a
reading of the Takings Clause; there is no explicit support for it in
any of the takings cases. To expand on Pennsylvania Coal's oft-cited
warning, "[g]overnment could hardly go on if [the State is liable per
26 6
se] for every . . . change in the general law."9
Under the Lucas analysis, would shoreline regulation qualify as
nuisance-prevention regulation?2 67 Shoreline regulation addresses
263. See id. at 1640.
264. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900 (recognizing an implied limitation on the use
of property for activities outside the "bundle of rights" attached to the title); see also
Berger, supra note 55, at 771 (discussing cases in which particular noxious uses were
precluded without compensation).
265. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02 (noting that, on remand, South Carolina could prevail only if it could "identify background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found").
266. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
267. Cf. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 ("On this analysis, the owner of a lake bed, for
example, would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit
to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding others'
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long-term erosion and other beach damage caused by overbuilding.26 8 However, while it does seek to prevent harm to the community in general, it does not seek to prevent exigent dangers to health
or safety, as envisioned by Justice Rehnquist's Penn Central dissent. 6 9 Although it has been argued that coastal setback regulations should be classified as nuisance-preventing on the theory that
the problem is a pre-eminent public safety concern, 2 7 more often
than not, the regulations are designed to prevent damage to the regulated property itself, rather than to other properties. These
problems at least raise the question of whether shoreline regulations are meant to prevent a traditional nuisance, to impose paternalistic controls or private property, or to exact a public good at
private cost.
Fashioning a just compensation test based on private nuisance
law and background principles of state property law avoids the
problem of state legislatures defining and redefining private property rights to avoid situations in which they owe compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. 2 7' The Lucas opinion seeks a firmer
foundation by requiring, in situations of total deprivation of use,
that any limitation on an owner's property rights relative to governmental regulation "inhere in the title itself," not in the legislative
decree.272
VI.

THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE AFTER

LucAs

The majority opinion in Lucas has injected some certainty and
much-needed guidance into land use regulatory takings jurisprudence. A nuisance-abatement statute is a valid exercise of the police
power; it does not, assuming it meets the rational-basis standard,
land."). In effect, a noncompensable shoreline regulation would "do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts... by adjacent landowners
.. under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally ..... Id. See generally Hwang,
supra note 7, at 34-35.
268. Hwang, supra note 7, at 35.
269. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144-45 (1978)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 325-26 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Hwang, supra note 7, at 35-38; see also Michelman, supra note 220, at 1603.
271. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-2900 (1992).
The distinction is illustrated by the Court's comparison of Scranton v. Wheeler, 179
U.S. 141 (1900) (holding no compensation was due in the instance of a traditional navigational servitude) with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding a
taking where a navigational servitude was imposed on a privately created marina). See
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
272. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.

202

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 52:162

violate the Constitution's Due Process Clauses. Because it takes no
recognized property right, it does not constitute a taking of property.2 73 When a land use regulation goes beyond prohibiting a common-law nuisance, however, it will cause a taking warranting just
compensation for any affected property owners under the reaffirmed Pennsylvania Coal quantitative balancing test if the regulation
fails to "substantially advance legitimate state interests.., or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land. 274 After Lucas, there
no longer is any question whether "or" means "or." A taking occurs irrespective of the first Agins prong if the property owner is denied economically viable use of his land, either because it involves a
physical invasion or because it renders the land entirely valueless.2 7 5
As the majority suggests, however, the vastly greater number of
controversial land use regulations do not involve the control of noxious uses, do further a legitimate state interest, and diminish-but
do not destroy-the economic value of the affected properties. 7 6
The effects of Lucas on the judicial resolution of most land use regulatory takings cases therefore will not be as dramatic as Lucas itself.
Yet the opinion contains some clarifying aspects. The per se rule
that deprivation of all value mandates just compensation is not applicable to takings challenges involving personal property, such as
the prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers in Andrus v. Allard,2 7
because of "the State's traditionally high degree of control over
commercial dealings. '2 78 Further, in the increasing number of noncategorical cases involving environmental and similar socially desirable regulations, the takings determination will continue to be an ad
hoc balancing of the sufficiency of the public interests supported by
the regulation under challenge with the significance of the private
273. See id. at 2900-02.
274. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
275. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. Although Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), is a physical invasion case, the Court reaffirmed that public
purpose and effect on property are separate tests:
The Court of Appeals determined that [the statute] serves the legitimate public
purpose of "rapid development of and maximum penetration by a means of
communication which has important educational and community aspects," and
thus is within the State's police power. We have no reason to question that
determination. It is a separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid
regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid.
Id. at 425 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) (dicta); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174.
276. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
277. 444 U.S. 51 (1979). Commentators have criticized Andrus for bringing unnecessary confusion to regulatory land use doctrine. See Berger, supra note 55, at 768-69.
278. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
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costs. As to the private costs, several Justices in Lucas suggested that
courts should continue to consider the extent of the diminution in
value and the extent of any interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations.2 7 9 Additionally, as to the public interests enumerated in support of the regulation, courts should evaluate those
interests free from the muddling effect of the former nuisance
exception.
Although the Lucas decision is a landmark development with respect to the scope of "taken" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment,
it provided no guidance for defining the proper unit of property for
purposes of making a takings determination.28 0 As Justice Blackmun correctly pointed out in his dissent, the evaluation of the regulation's economic impact on a property owner will vary with the
parcel of property viewed as taken. 21' The old problem of the three
estates in coal mining property,28 2 for example, remains unresolved
by the Lucas contributions to land use regulatory takings jurisprudence. Such problems are inherent in a quantitative ad hoc weighing of relevant factors. Yet they are balanced somewhat by the
consequential flexibility. After Lucas, courts must still ultimately impose the costs of legitimate and desirable land use regulations on
either the public taxpayers who will benefit or on the affected landowners. The analytical framework established by Lucas is designed
to allow this while achieving "justice and fairness. 28 3
Implicit in the judicial test that balances public gain against private harm is the question of who should fund public resources in a
democracy. When regulations prevent an owner from making a
publicly harmful use of property, society will tolerate the result even
if it causes a large decrease in property values. When the loss is
total, however, basic fairness requires that society as a whole bear
279. See id. at 2895 n.8; id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2925 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
280. The majority specifically reserved the issue of defining the property interest. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court did not find a taking even though the Landmarks
Preservation Law prohibited entirely the use of the air rights on the property, because
Penn Central retained the use of the Terminal itself. The Court recognized that there
was a diminution of the total value of the parcel (considering the air rights as part of the
"bundle of rights" comprising the Terminal property, not as an independent property
interest), but found that, as long as the existing use was preserved and some additional
subsequent uses were possible, the diminution in value was insufficient to entitle the
property owner to relief. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
136-37 (1978). See infra notes 345-348 and accompanying text.
281. See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
282. See supra notes 27-32, 96-102 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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the cost, rather than the sole property owner.28 4 It is just such loading of the loss on one property owner that the Fifth Amendment was
designed to prevent. 2 5 Public policy should not be determined by
accidents of ownership; rather, society as a whole should pay for
societal benefits.
The Supreme Court opinion in Lucas created categorical rules
for determining when compensation must be paid in the event of
certain expansive regulatory takings.28 6 The Court recognized two
"discrete categories" of regulatory takings cases in which compensation must be paid per se. The first category is the case of a physical invasion of real estate. 28 7 The second category is the case where
a regulation denies the property owner all economic use of the
property.28 8 In recognizing these two distinct categories, the Lucas
majority followed the second prong of the Agins test literally.28 9
There is no question that control of nuisance is a proper end of
the police power. 29" To say this, however, only partially addresses
the first prong of the two-prong Agins test. The larger issue, and the
one involved in Lucas, is determining what result obtains when government seeks to regulate or prohibit uses in the public interest
when those uses are not nuisances in and of themselves. Clearly,
government can prohibit or regulate activities in such cases as long
as the governmental action substantially advances a legitimate governmental goal.2 9 ' In all of these cases, however, the courts still
must reach the second Agins prong and consider the effect of the
regulation on the use and value of the land. The cases indicate that
284. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (warning that "the natural tendency of human nature" to expand police-power restrictions on private property must be checked).
285. The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 325-26 (1893).
286. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See id. at 2893-94.
290. See EPSTEIN, supra note 220, at 112.

291. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-39 (1987); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). The legitimate-governmental-goal test is not a rigorous test
for measuring government action. See EPSTEIN, supra note 220, at 109 ("The legitimate
state interest test in vogue today is a bare conclusion, tantamount to asserting that the
action is legitimate because it is lawful.").
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the closer the prohibited use comes to being a traditionally recognized nuisance, the greater the reduction in use and value of the
land the courts will tolerate.2 9 2 Until the Lucas decision, however,
the Supreme Court had not considered the result when the owner
was totally deprived of the use or value of his real estate. Despite
the Keystone majority's reliance on Mugler, the Supreme Court had
never held, even under the nuisance doctrine, that the government
can deprive an owner of all use or value.
The rationale for Lucas's categorical rule appears to be related
to the oft-stated underlying purpose of the Fifth Amendment; when
a regulation leaves a property owner with no economic use of his
property, it is more than likely that the property is being used to
benefit the public. 29 3 This may be true even though the legislative
enactment endeavors to make it appear that the purpose of the regulation is to mitigate serious public harms. 29 4 The Court seems to
regard these circumstances as a de facto taking for public use.
Viewed in this light, the property owner would be entitled to compensation through direct application of the Fifth Amendment,
rather than the indirect approach of an inverse condemnation or
regulatory taking action. 95
There also may be an argument that Lucas was entitled to compensation under the "character of the government action" factor of
the economic viability test. Although this test has been interpreted
primarily as referring to a physical invasion of property,2 9 6 an argument can be made, based on the purpose and nature of the restrictions in coastal-regulation cases, that an interest in the property
virtually has been granted to the public. If beachfront property
owners cannot build on their property, then all they have left is bare
possession. Such a regulation arguably creates rights in the public,
whom the regulation is designed to benefit.2 9 7 The property owner
must maintain the property for the benefit of the public, which gets
the benefit free. 29" The landowner has no way of recouping costs or
292. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-81 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 406, 411 (1915); cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 220, at 120-21.
293. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94. See supra note 285.
294. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95 (warning that regulations designed to preserve
land in its natural state "carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm").
295. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 220, at 115.

296. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982).
297. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
298. Id.
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receiving any return on the property.
This analysis would make the "harmful or noxious use" principle of Mugler v. Kansas29 9 and its progeny a consideration under the
first (substantial advancement) prong of the Agins test. If the governmental purpose behind a regulation is controlling a harmful or
noxious use, that purpose clearly provides a sufficient police-power
basis for the regulation. This analysis merely states that the government has a legitimate goal that permits it to affect property value by
regulation without an obligation to compensate.3 0 0 It is entirely
consistent with Supreme Court precedent to allow the government
to prohibit a particular use without the necessity of paying compensation.3 0 ' The harmful-use inquiry therefore clearly goes to the first
prong of the Agins test.3 0 2 In the early cases, the nuisance doctrine
was used to define the permissible scope of the police power, rather
than to create an exception to the requirement of paying just
3 03
compensation.
A better reading of the case law distinguishes between due process and just compensation. The extent to which a regulation seeks
to serve the public interest, including whether it prevents a private
property owner from harming public interests, relates to the determination of whether it is a valid police-power measure: does the
regulation substantially advance a legitimate state interest? 3°4 A
regulation passing muster under the due-process test then must be
examined to see whether it deprives the property owner of all viable
use or value.3 0 5 Not until Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon30 6 did the
299. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
300. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897, 2899 (1992).
Justice Scalia warned, however, that this rationale "cannot be the basis for departing
from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated." Id. at
2899.
301. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 17880 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669-70 (1887); see generally Berger, supra note
55, at 771-72.
302. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-99.
303. See id. at 2898-99; Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1176
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Connors, supra note 12, at 156-58. All of
the justices in Keystone appeared to accept the existence of the nuisance exception. See
Michelman, supra note 220, at 1602-03.
304. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895, 904 (S.C. 1991) (Harwell, J., dissenting), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
305. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
136-37 (1978).
306. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Supreme Court explicitly decide that a regulatory enactment could
be invalidated as a taking if it too severely diminished the value of
the property. 0 7 The relationship between the Due Process and
Takings Clauses was succinctly stated by the Court in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles :311 "This basic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." 3' 9 This rationale
is consistent with the analytical framework established by the Court
in Agins v. City of Tiburon." l ' A regulation violates the Fifth Amendment when it either fails to substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest or denies the owner economically viable use of her
land.3 1 '
The Supreme Court opinion in Lucas brings considerable order
to two seemingly contradictory lines of authority: the Mugler case
and its progeny, on the one hand, and Pennsylvania Coal and the
more-modern takings cases, on the other. In the first instance, the
majority simply chose the Pennsylvania Coal opinion over the Mugler
line of cases."1 2 Although the Lucas opinion amounted to a rejection
of the Mugler principle, it did not overrule or explicitly reject Mugler;
rather, the majority distinguished the Mugler line of cases on two
separate grounds.
First, the majority distinguished the Mugler line on the basis that
those cases did not depend on the noxiousness of the use. i3 The
Court pointed out, as it did in Penn Central, that the uses involved in
the Mug/er line of cases were perfectly lawful in themselves and did
not constitute common-law nuisances.3 1 4 Second, the Lucas majority pointed out that neither Mugler nor any of the other cases in307. Id. at 413, 415; see also Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155-56 (1921).
308. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
309. Id. at 315.
310. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
311. Id. at 260; see aso Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35
(1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978);
Michelman, supra note 220, at 1607.
312. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892, 2899 (1992).
Both Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens accused the majority of abandoning Muger
and its subsequent precedent. See id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court restricts one judge-made rule and expands
another.").
313. See id. at 2897.
314. See id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34
n.30). See also Connors, supra note 12, at 143.
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volved a total deprivation of use or value of the regulated
property. 1 5 In all of these cases, the regulation prohibited only one
specific use of the property.5 1 6 The same was true of the early cases
upholding government demolition of unsafe structures."1 7 In those
cases, the courts held that structures in danger of collapse constituted nuisances and could be demolished without compensation,
but that the property owner nonetheless retained title to the underlying property and could put it to any legal use.3 1 8 However, the
conclusion that a public agency can demolish unsafe buildings without payment of compensation does not support the application of
the nuisance exception to deny compensation when the property
owner has no remaining viable use of the property.
The Lucas holding is entirely consistent with the Court's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, and is a clear indication that the Lucas Court
affirmed the Pennsylvania Coal framework in preference to that of the
Mugler line of cases. The Pennsylvania Coal Court, in pointing out
that the litigation involved a "single private house," held that a
"source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if
similar damage is inflicted on others in different places. The dam-

315. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 & n.13; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987) (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
316. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibiting excavation of sand and gravel below water table); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (requiring cedar trees within two miles of apple groves to be cut down); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibiting the manufacture of brick on property);
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (prohibiting use of property as
livery stable); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibiting use of property as a
brewery).
The Court was clear that the owner retained use of the property for any lawful
purpose. See, e.g., Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 (relying on the absence of evidence in the
record of a reduction in property value to indicate that property could still be put to
profitable uses); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 412 (noting that the ordinance prohibited manufacture of brick, but permitted removal of brick clay); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669 ("Such
legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful
purposes ....").
The same was true of Penn Central to the extent that Justice Brennan's opinion could
be read as implying that the New York Landmarks Preservation Law prevented Penn
Central from creating a nuisance by alteration or destruction of the facade of Grand
Central Terminal. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30
(1978). Penn Central was permitted to make any other lawful use of its property. Id. at
136.
317. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Housing Codes, Building Demolition, andJust Compensation:
A Rationalefor the Exercise of Public Powers Over Slum Housing, 67 MicH. L. REV. 635, 639-43,
646-47 (1969).
318. See id.
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age is not common or public.""1 9
The inherent difficulty in making this type of judgment led the
Supreme Court to abandon one of its traditional approaches to takings cases, the analysis of whether the regulation "prevents harmful
use" or "confers benefits. ' 3 20 Notably, the harm-versus-benefit test
had already been seriously confused in the Court's Penn Central
32
opinion. '
The Supreme Court has recognized that the police power is a
governmental device to regulate private property to prevent its use
in a manner detrimental to the public good. 2 2 By definition, therefore, almost any exercise of the police power is harm-preventing. If
this were the sole criterion for takings-clause analysis, a regulatory
taking would rarely, if ever, be found.3 23 It was in direct response to
this reading of Mugler that the Supreme Court evaluated the regulation at issue in Pennsylvania Coal and held that a "strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
3 24
paying for the change.The Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas indicated that the noxious-use rationale that appeared in the earlier cases led to the development of a broader, affirmative police-power basis for determining
the validity of governmental regulations.3 25 Thus, the justification
for noncompensable takings, that began as regulation designed to
prevent public harm, metamorphosed into the broader standard of
regulation for the public good. However, this portion of the analysis applies solely to the first prong of the Agins test: whether the
319. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). In Penn Central, the
statement of purpose in the Landmarks Preservation Law indicated that the regulation
was not nuisance-based. See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 109.
320. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992). Justice
Scalia wrote that this "logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory 'taking'-which require compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not require
compensation." Id.
321. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; Kmiec, supra note 139, at 1636 (noting
that "even though restrictions may be characterized as preventing harms, some may be
impermissibly designed to compel benefits").
322. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-91 (1926).
323. Cf. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1177 (Fed. Cir.)
(holding that the "public purpose" of a regulation cannot serve as the basis for a finding
that, when the entire value of the regulated property is destroyed, no taking has occurred), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1540
(Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[P]roper exercise of regulatory authority does not automatically preclude a finding that such action is a compensable taking.").
324. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
325. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2896-97 (1992).
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regulation substantially advances a legitimate governmental interest.5 26 While generalized public benefits and harms may be sufficient to sustain a regulation on the grounds of substantial
advancement, the Court now clearly recognizes that they are not a
basis for depriving a property owner of compensation when the regulation destroys all economic use or value. In this respect, the Keystone opinion can be distinguished as holding merely that a
regulation designed to prevent mine subsidence is sufficiently related to a valid governmental purpose to avoid a finding that there is
a taking on lack-of-substantial-advancement grounds.3 2 7 Because
the harm-versus-benefit distinction "is often in the eye of the beholder,"
it is not a reasonable basis to determine whether compensation should be available under the Fifth Amendment. The
subjective nature of the harm-versus-benefit analysis led the Lucas
Court to abandon it in favor of the categorical test.
The very basis of land use control involves the separation of
uses in order to prevent adverse impacts of one use on another.3 29
Thus, industrial or other uses involving harmful externalities can be
prohibited on land adjacent to residential areas without a taking,
provided the owner is left with a reasonable use of the property.3 3 0
This separation of uses can be viewed as nuisance prevention, and
justified as a reasonable exercise of the police power, since it is reasonably related to a valid public purpose. Viewed in this context,
nuisance control is merely a focus for defining the public interest.
Because it meets the first prong of the Agins test, it is noncompensable on that basis. In addition, most traditional land use controls, in
separating one use from another, do not render property entirely
useless, although an owner may be severely restricted in the use of
her land to protect neighboring land. As long as the restriction
does not deprive the owner of all use or value, the regulation is noncompensable under the second prong of the Agins test.
Arguably, the Pennsylvania Coal decision itself recognized the
appropriate balance between the two prongs. In holding that
"some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power, ' 3 3' the Court recognized that all property
326. See id. at 2897.
327. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490, 492
(1987).
328. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
329. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-97 (1926).
330. See Kmiec, supra note 139, at 1636-37.
331. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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is subject to governmental regulation in the public interest, such as
preventing public harms. On the other hand, if such regulation diminishes value too greatly, "in most if not in all cases there must be
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
332
act."
A doctrinal benefit of the categorical rule is that it allows a
property owner to claim entitlement to compensation under the
Fifth Amendment without challenging the validity of the regulation.
Lucas himself chose not to challenge the South Carolina Coastal
Council regulation. He conceded that it met the due-process test by
substantially advancing legitimate governmental interests.3 3s The
South Carolina Supreme Court held, however, that once this concession was made, the property owner was not entitled to compensation; the owner seeking compensation for a regulation that
destroys value must challenge the regulation on due-process
grounds.3 3 4 In so holding, the South Carolina opinion merged the
two-pronged test for judging the validity of a regulatory program
under the Fifth Amendment. Had this procedure survived Supreme
Court review, it would have distorted the judicial process and
wasted the time, effort, and resources of the litigants and the judiciary. Moreover, the disjunctive nature of the test was clear from the
holdings in Agins and Nollan. ss5 In the Supreme Court's opinion in
Lucas, discussion of the validity of the regulation-as distinct from
its effect on property use and value-is a due-process consideration,
placed analytically within consideration of whether the regulation
332. Id.
333. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2890 (1992); see
generally Hwang, supra note 7, at 23-27 (discussing legitimate governmental interest
within the context of shoreline setback regulations).
334. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). If this were a correct statement of the law, no case would
ever be decided on the grounds that the regulation cut deeply into value. In order for
landowners to prevail on the value issue, they would have to win on lack of substantial
advancement grounds. However, once landowners prevail on this ground, the regulation must be held invalid; there would then be no need to decide economic impact (except to determine if there had been a temporary taking during the period the invalid
regulation was in effect). As interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme Court, a property owner who lost a takings claim after challenging on due-process grounds could not
then argue economic impact because nuisance-prevention would have provided the government with a complete defense.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 70, 78. The analysis in Keystone also discussed
both prongs. After establishing the existence of a legitimate state interest, the Court
found no taking because the landowner failed to establish a denial of all economically
viable use or value of the property. Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. Mahon, 480 U.S.
470, 493 (1987). See supra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
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substantially advanced legitimate governmental interests.3 3 6 In recognizing this distinction, the Supreme Court underscored the "or"
in the Agins test.33 7 A property owner can challenge a burdensome
regulation on the first prong of the Agins test, and seek to invalidate
it,3 38 or accept the regulation as meeting the due-process test but
33 9
litigate its effect on the value of the property.
It would be useless to require a property owner to challenge the
validity of a regulation as a prerequisite to an inverse condemnation
suit. As the Court stated in First English, compensation is available
under the Fifth Amendment "in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. "340 A litigant should-and would
after Lucas-be able to concede the validity of the regulation and sue
to recover Fifth Amendment compensation based solely on the economic effect of the regulation on the property.
It seems clear that the Lucas opinion will not create a revolution
in takings jurisprudence, or open the courthouse and subject governmental entities to a flood of litigation. The holding applies only
to situations involving total takings, in which owners are deprived of
"all economically beneficial use" of their property.3 4 ' The Court
recognized that these cases are relatively rare. 4 2
Although it might be hard to imagine a situation in which the
only use of land is one that would directly injure neighbors or the
public, this limitation results in a more reasonable application of a
nuisance exception. 43 Such situations would be rare, 4 4 but that is
336. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
337. See id. at 2900 (holding that a compensable taking occurs when a regulation "prohibit[s] all economically beneficial use of land" even ifit addresses a legitimate state
interest).
338. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
339. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896.
340. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987).
341. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. The Court recognized that even in cases involving less
than total deprivation of use or value, the economic impact of the regulation-the extent
to which it diminished value and interfered with investment-backed expectations-remains a factor that must be evaluated in the multi-factor analysis. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2895 n.8.
Application of the investment-backed expectations test should favor Lucas. When
he purchased his property, other houses existed on adjacent lots (including the lot between the two purchased by Lucas) and on other lots along the same stretch of beach.
Id. at 2889. Lucas could well have supposed that he would be permitted to use his
property in a manner similar to neighboring property owners.
342. The Court refers to "the extraordinary circumstance" and the "relatively rare"
situation of total deprivation of all use or value. Id. at 2894.
343. See Connors, supra note 12, at 169 ("[T]otal elimination of value can be justified
without compensation only if the exclusive use of the property is imminently danger-
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to be expected when considering an exception to protections included in the Bill of Rights. Because the determination of public
health and safety harms is necessarily subjective, an exception to the
Takings Clause based on such determinations could lead to real
abuse of individual rights.
A holding that compensation is due should not hinder government's authority to regulate for the public benefit. The availability
of compensation to a private landowner does not affect the government's ability to impose the regulation;3 4 5 in Lucas itself, the only
issue was the availability of compensation when a regulation was an
otherwise proper exercise of the police power. Additionally, the
number of cases in which compensation must be paid will be relatively small. Most regulations leave property owners some economically viable use of their property,3 4 6 and the courts have held that
no compensable taking has occurred even when the loss in value has
been great, 4 7 or the remaining use is very small.3 4 8
It will thus be relatively rare for a property owner to be entitled
to compensation. This should provide an answer to critics who
maintain that the public will be financially unable to implement
much-needed regulatory initiatives if compensation becomes a read-

ous."); cf.Berger, supra note 55, at 771 (noting that, to avoid paying compensation for a
total taking, a regulation must prohibit only specific uses that constitute nuisances);
Lawrence, supra note 113, at 414 (stating that the rationale supporting the nuisance exception to paying just compensation does not require a different analysis when all use or
value is destroyed).
344. In leading cases establishing the nuisance exception, the Court either did not
find a common-law nuisance or did not consider that determination controlling. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) (question not controlling); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (refusing to decide whether the activity was a
common-law nuisance); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915) (question not controlling); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (question not
controlling).
345. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 315 (1960) (noting that the Fifth Amendment is designed "not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking").
346. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1960);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887). It may not be the use the owner desires or
as profitable as the owner expected, but no taking will be found as long as the use is
economically viable.
347. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922);
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405; see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
384 (1926). It is well established that a police power regulation can permissibly deprive
an owner of the property's most beneficial use. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592.
348. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
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ily available remedy.3 4 9 A "crisis" is even less likely in view of the
procedural and jurisdictional barriers to relief erected by the
Supreme Court. 5 °
After Lucas, however, states probably will not be able to prohibit normal real estate development if the effect of the prohibition
is to deprive the property owner of all economically beneficial use.
The Lucas opinion requires, at least in cases where there is a total
taking, that the state compensate property owners when the regulated use consists of normal development activity. 3 5 '
The Lucas majority took notice of the fact that normal development activities almost never constitute a nuisance: "the fact that a
particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners
ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition .... 352
Lucas was not engaging in a noxious or dangerous activity. His request was to build two single-family homes on two building lots.
This activity was no different from what other owners had customarily done with their land in the area; numerous other homes had
been built on similarly situated lots adjacent to Lucas's property and
nearby.353 It seems clear that background principles of South Caro349. See FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 321; id. at 340-41 (Stevens,J., dissenting); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 660-61 & n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Even if takings compensation were to materially increase the cost of governmental
regulation, "a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416; see also First English, 482 U.S. at 321-22.
350. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-52
(1986) (requiring final administrative decision on legally permitted uses); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (requiring
final administrative decision and state court action for just compensation); San Diego Gas
& Elec., 450 U.S. at 632-33 (dismissing appeal in absence of a final judgment as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding the
matter not ripe for review because owner never submitted a development proposal for
city review). For the application of these jurisprudential barriers, see, e.g., United States
v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1987); Jentgen v. United States, 657
F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Deltona Corp. v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
351. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992).
352. Id.; see also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 166-67
(1990) (holding that mining a rock quarry was not a nuisance because other similar activities existed in the area).
353. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. Lucas's right to build on his property is entitled to
constitutional protection: "The right of [a landowner] to devote its land to any legitimate use is property within the protection of the Constitution." Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); see also Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (commenting that building on one's
property is a right, not a privilege, subject only to legitimate permitting requirements);
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lina property law do not declare construction or ownership of
beachfront homes a public nuisance3sCONCLUSION

Lucas v. South Carolina CoastalCouncil provided a firm foundation
and much-needed guidance on both the regulatory takings doctrine
and the position of the "nuisance exception" as a governmental defense to a takings claim. The opinion supports and gives context to
the regulatory takings doctrine first enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, by clearly reaffirming that a nuisance-abatement statute is a valid exercise of the police power, conforms to due-process
requirements if it substantially relates to a legitimate governmental
purpose, and does not effect a taking unless it denies owners all economically viable use of their land or physically invades their property. The Court reaffirmed the Agins disjunctive test; if a regulation
fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests, or if it deprives the owner of all use or value of the land, a taking has occurred. In deciding the latter prong, Lucas recognized two
categories of per se takings: when a regulation constitutes a physical invasion and when it renders the land valueless.
The nuisance doctrine developed in a separate line of cases,
commencing with Mugler v. Kansas, and crept into the takings cases
through then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. It was interpreted in a variety of divergent ways and legitimized in both majority and dissenting opinions
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis in 1987. The potential
danger of the adoption of a broad nuisance exception, as loosely
defined in Keystone, was nowhere better illustrated than in the South
Carolina Supreme Court opinion in Lucas. That opinion accepted a
nuisance-exception analysis as justification for denying Fifth
Amendment just compensation, based only on a legislative assertion
that the regulated activity constituted a great public harm. Had the
United States Supreme Court affirmed that holding, every state legislature would have been able to redefine what constitutes a nuisance to avoid Fifth Amendment scrutiny, greatly weakening the
protection accorded landowners.
supra note 220, at 123 ("The normal bundle of property rights ... regards
use, including development, as one of the standard incidents of ownership.").
354. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court
agreed. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992)
(denying that "any common law basis exists by which [the Council] could restrain Lucas's desired use of the land").
cf. EPSTEIN,
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Instead, Lucas narrowly defined the scope of the nuisance exception, in line with Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in
Keystone. First, the Court made clear that when a regulation renders
land valueless, a legislative declaration of the public interest, regardless of its importance, cannot justify the regulation and avoid
the requirement for Fifth Amendment compensation. Second, the
Court held that total deprivation of use or value is permissible only
when the property's use constituted a nuisance under background
principles of state nuisance and property law, and therefore never
was part of the owner's title.
This narrow reading of the nuisance exception is entirely consistent with the focus and purpose of the regulatory takings doctrine, once the Mugler line of cases is distinguished as applicable
only to the due-process prong of the Agins test. A broader reading
of the exception would have greatly weakened property rights by
allowing most regulations to be self-justifying. Certainly, when government regulation denies an owner all viable use of the property,
there must be a very significant and widely acknowledged justification that would allow the government to avoid the requirement of
just compensation. Prevention of traditional common-law nuisances
provides such a justification.
The opinion is important as well in its recognition that even in
the case of less than a total deprivation of use or value, the property
owner may still be entitled to a remedy. 5 5 The categorical rule established in Lucas applies only to the case of complete reduction in
value. In all cases, however, the court must assess the economic impact of the regulation and the extent to which it interferes with investment-backed expectations.35 6
The Lucas opinion carefully and thoughtfully analyzed the impact of regulations in the public interest in our constitutional democracy, where individuals are free from being forced to shoulder
burdens that benefit society in general.3 5 7 The costs of government
regulation should not be allocated simply by accident of ownership.
Lucas is another strong reminder that when laws sacrifice individual
rights for the sake of the good of society as a whole, society has an
obligation to pay back the individual.

355. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
356. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
357. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893); see supra note 285 and accompanying
text.

